The Human Costs of the Matchstick Solution: The Dynamics of Changing Borders and Ethnic Cleansing in Poland, 1945

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Each genocide is different, but it would be a mistake to dismiss the similarities. Foremost among them is the suffering of the victims. There is no better or worse genocide, just as there is no better or worse murder, no better or worse torture. There is no scale to measure suffering. Jews, Armenians or Poles who were martyred and murdered all suffered the same.... The Holocaust was not unique, because that would mean that it could never happen again, to anyone, Jewish or otherwise. This is simply not true. The Holocaust was perpetrated by humans, for human reasons, and anything done by humans can be repeated—not in exactly the same form, but in similar or parallel ways.

Yehuda Bauer

Torn apart in many ways by the Second World War, Poland reemerged in 1945 in different territorial form as the result of the famous “matchstick solution” introduced at the Teheran Conference in 1943 and confirmed by the Big Three's bland confirmation of the new Polish borders and of corresponding “population transfers” at Potsdam.

In late November 1943, at the first meeting of the Big Three, Churchill and Roosevelt had broached the subject of the future borders of Poland over dinner and drinks. Churchill's view was that Poland's loss of its eastern territories demanded by Stalin should simply be compensated by incorporating eastern Germany into Poland. "Personally," Churchill wrote after the war, "I thought Poland might move westward, like soldiers taking two steps, 'left close.'" In pitching the idea to Stalin, Churchill apparently adopted a simpler metaphor which could be illustrated in visual form. He took out three matches, and showed Stalin how each match--the Soviet Union, Poland, and Germany--would move to the west a step or two. Churchill recorded that "this pleased Stalin." Churchill later described his thinking: "If Poland trod on some German toes, that could not be helped, but there must be a strong Poland." Nearly two years later, at Potsdam, the Allied chiefs made a declaration that echoed concerns discussed on that jovial evening in Teheran in 1943: the displacements of populations, they declared, were to be carried out in an "orderly and humane manner."

Eastern Poland was thus incorporated into the Soviet Union, Eastern Germany into Poland. In the course of driving out (or killing) some eight million Germans, both the Soviets and various Polish elites practiced brutalities which have long been known, even if scholars paid little attention to the subject until the last decade. On the other hand, the simultaneous ethnic cleansing of over a million and a quarter Poles from Eastern Poland has scarcely been discussed in accounts of the postwar settlement, even by specialists. Further, ferocious ethnic violence erupted in the Polish southeast as Ukrainian nationalist organizations took advantage of war conditions to carry out ethnic cleansings of Poles in that quarter, the Poles in turn forcing 200,000 Ukrainians to leave their homes and be resettled in scattered fashion in the new western territories. These grim numbers allow us to see a mere outline of the violence that lay in the background of the matchstick solution.
This paper will be an attempt to assess the nature of this many-sided ethnic violence. The object of the first part of this study is akin to recent work by Timothy Snyder, who ambitiously devoted a long article to establish a useable narrative of violence in the Polish-Ukrainian borderlands during the war—Polish violence against Ukrainians and Ukrainian violence against Poles. My aim is still more ambitious, or at least more foolhardy: to draw on recent literature to reconstruct a general narrative of the ethnic violence in Poland during the period of world war. In the second section, I will use both survivor accounts and recent archival discoveries to comment on some aspects of this narrative.

The deep background of Poland's rebirth in 1918/1919 plays a large role in the ethnic violence of the World War II years. The new Polish state of 1918/19 found itself in charge of non-Polish ethnic minorities which, combined, equaled in number the ethnic Poles of Poland. And the ruling elites of the new state—from the standpoints of party, class, and ethnicity—were in one degree or another devoted to a hard-shelled Polish nationalism. Poland also fought a bitter war with the Soviets on her eastern border in 1920 and 1921, a war which added to ethnic bitterness, especially in the Polish-Ukrainian borderlands.

In spite of Allied attempts to protect minorities in Poland and in other successor states, minorities suffered. Poland began its new life with popular and officially sanctioned violence against Jews and ethnic Germans (1918-1921) and eventually expanded this violence to other minorities as well: Ukrainians, Belorussians, Lithuanians, Czechs, Slovaks, Russians, Lemkos, Roma people and others. Some among the minority populations had fled after World War I, and some (comparatively few) were killed. But the atmosphere of violence allowed recrimination to flourish, fueled by the powerful states of Germany and the Soviet Union which maintained various connections to related minorities.

In examining the growth of ethnic violence in and around Poland, we must turn first to the Soviet Union. One of the principle doctrines of Marxism-Leninism bolstered already existing habits of nationalisms in the region: the doctrine of collective guilt and collective punishment. Throughout the East Central Europe from the 1930s onward, this doctrine spread vigorously. Quite simply, it ran as follows: Those who belong the same family, group, clan, tribe, or nation as the offending individual must be guilty of the same deviations, and hence must be punished as a class, and just as if they were an offending class. National groupings (always something of a collectivist expression) fit well into Stalin's paranoid version of the doctrine.

Robert Conquest has rightly dubbed Josef Stalin the "breaker of nations": some of his earliest practice of this métier was in the borderlands between the old Russian Empire and Poland. What would become a tidal wave of human dislocation and destruction began in 1934/35, when Stalin, in conjunction with forced collectivization, deported or killed tens of thousands of Poles living in the so-called Polish Autonomous Districts in Western Ukraine (especially Volhynia) and Belarus. This ethnic cleansing continued from 1934 right up the outbreak of the war, and indeed beyond. Officially, the purging of the
Poles from Belarus and Ukraine ended in 1938, but in that year the NKVD in the Belarus Soviet Socialist Republic arrested 14,000 ethnic Poles to begin a more or less systematic ethnic cleansing of the whole region. Some estimates of the dead range up to half a million. When the Soviets took control of the whole Polish Eastern Border region (the Kresy Wschodnie) as a result of the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact and the Polish war of 1939, they were not only able, roughly, to double the territory and population of the White Russian republic, they also gained a large population of nearly a million and half ethnic Poles (in a total population of about 4.1 million). Terror, death, and deportation marked the occupational regime. Between 1939 and 1941, when the first Soviet occupation was ended by Operation Barbarossa, some 1.5 million Poles were deported to the Gulag system. These deportations were unambiguously ethnic in character. So were the famous Katyn Forest executions of some 15,000 Polish carried out by the NKVD during the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland. Indeed, a pattern of mass executions, in the Kurapaty, outside of Minsk, and other places may be seen in part as a continuation of the Soviet program of ethnic cleansing of the Soviet empire's western border.

Much better known is the violence unleashed by the Germans in the creation of their Lebensraum form of Poland. From the Polish territory incorporated into the Reich, the Germans expelled an estimated 900,000 ethnic Poles, counted apart from the 600,000 Jews who were deported to camps and ghettos in German-occupied Poland, the Generalgouvernement. In the Generalgouvernement itself, the Lebensraum regime may have displaced as many as 1.7 million Poles, over and above Jews, who were usually first displaced, then killed.

Poland had the highest percentage of its population killed of any belligerent, twenty-two percent. About six million Polish citizens were killed under the German occupation, about half of these Jews. Hence, some three million Poles died as a result of German racial policies and wartime brutalities.

In the context of this short presentation, I have chosen not to include more than a few comments on the Holocaust, since my audience here is fully aware of the relevant details. Some comments should suffice. In the context of all the killing, ethnic cleansing, and other violence described here, Polish Jews were suffering popular violence from their neighbors, the kind described by Jan Gross in his much discussed book Neighbors. They were threatened by starvation, disease, and the associated emotional catastrophes of suffering loved ones. They were being killed systematically first by Einsatzgruppen and their auxiliaries, later in the Operation Reinhard death camps, and still later in the centralized death machine of Auschwitz. In sum, of the 3.3 million Jews living in Poland in 1939, three million were dead by 1945. Their plight is at the center of the ethnic violence in Poland. It was at once, genocide and ethnic cleansing.

Yet as the war moved to its end, as the machinery of the Holocaust began to grind down or be dismantled, as the Wehrmacht was pushed relentlessly westward by the Soviet army, ethnic violence persisted in Poland. Crashing waves of savage ethnic violence, murder, and ethnic cleansing marked the period, partly as the result of the new
Soviet invasion and occupation, partly as the result of a kind of general retributional civil war, partly as the result of the intentions of the new Polish governments, and in part because of the diplomatic solution of the matchsticks.

The situation in southeastern Poland, on the Ukrainian border, is crucial in understanding the crescendo of the internal violence. Under German occupation, the large Ukrainian minority in southeastern Poland found competing sources for their allegiance. Indeed, within the old Polish borders, the occupiers often favored the Ukrainians over the Poles and stood surety for their retribution against the Poles for previous persecution. Still, the Germans treated Ukrainians as lower beings and created a general anti-German hostility. As the German position began to weaken after Stalingrad, the radical Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and its paramilitary units, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), set out on a program to prepare for a future state which would be ethnically Ukrainian. In 1943, the UPA began a concerted program of cleansing Western Ukraine—Volhynia (Województwo Wołyńskie) and Eastern Galicia. About 50,000 ethnic Poles died in vicious attacks on their settlements. Some 350,000 ethnic Poles were driven from their homes.13 These Poles then sought shelter in eastern Poland, where in fact, even under the Nazi occupation regime, ethnic strife was raging.

By the logic of the matchstick movement, the westernmost piece of the puzzle had to be completed first. With the Soviet army approaching the German border by the early fall of 1944, many ethnic Germans living in the Generalgouvernement and indeed in eastern Germany were forbidden to flee. In the flush of victory, brutalized by the war, and ideologically prepared, the Russian troops carried out a significant amount of the expulsion of Germans themselves.14 Alerted by reports of Russian killing and brutality, the largely female, young, and elderly population of Germans in the German-Polish borderlands prepared to flee from the next advances of the Russians. As this flight took place in January 1945, many died from the bitter cold, especially since the number of very young and the very old was high. But the Russian army was even more directly involved in killing many: tanks ran over some; some were shot; some, crossing the iced over Frisches Haff to get to Baltic rescue ships, had the ice broken around them by Russian dive bombers and perished in the sea. Hundreds of accounts attest to these brutalities and many others.15 Mass raping of German women by Russian soldiers from the Generalgouvernement to Berlin was, if unprecedented for its extensive and ferocity, of a class with the mass raping familiar to western observers since the 1990s. Alexander Solzhenitsyn witness such violence in East Prussia, wrote a poem on the subject. In fact, his famous arrest took place in part because of such criticisms of the Soviet treatment of civilians.16 He later commented: "For three weeks the war had been going on inside Germany, and all of us knew very well that if the girls were German they could be raped and then shot. This was almost a combat distinction."17

After a few months, the Russians established order, and a different sort of ethnic cleansing began emerge, involving the empowerment of local Polish paramilitaries and governmental units. By
the territorial agreement, Poland now claimed territory all the way to the Oder and Western Neisse Rivers in the west, east of which some eight million ethnic Germans had lived before the war. The Soviets had driven out many, but there were many left. The new Polish authorities and various roving paramilitary units now declared open season on the Germans, expropriating them, committing the usual range of violence, both informal and formal, and eventually imprisoning large numbers of ethnic Germans in concentration camps and on various labor sites. German forced labor would continue for several years after the war. Eventually, most of the members of the German minority were expelled, finding themselves with no means in one or other occupation zones in Germany, or elsewhere.\textsuperscript{18}

An important generator of this whole process of expulsion was the Allied agreement.\textsuperscript{19} The Western Allies had suggested something like an eastern Polish border that have moved west to correspond to the old Curzon Line, a line suggested by the British to form the boundary of eastern Poland after World War I. The actual line had been drawn well to the east, to include much of Belarus and Ukraine. In fact, the Russians were keenly aware of this line, and it corresponded very closely to the line by which Molotov and Ribbentrop agreed to divide Poland just as the war started in 1939. Churchill, as seen above, made the first suggestion, but Stalin’s attitude from Teheran onward was to push events in eastern Poland quickly, so as to preclude any second thoughts on the part of the Allies. It was, as Churchill pointed out to him repeated, in support of Poland that the British had gotten into the war. So the process of the matchstick solution involved simply Poland's evacuation of 180,000 square kilometers in the east (nearly half of its pre-war territory) and settlement of 103,000 square kilometers in the west. The pre-war population in the eastern lands was about thirteen million, between five and six million of them ethnic Poles or Jews (about one million). The brutalities of two occupations had altered these numbers, but some 2.5 million Poles and Jews still lived in the region in 1944. At the same time, half a million Ukrainians still lived in the eastern regions of the new Poland.

With the Teheran proposals for moving Poland westward on the planning board but not confirmed, the Soviet Ukraine and Belarus and the Lithuanian Soviet republic in September 1944 concluded arrangements for the "mutual evacuation of citizens." Under this rubric, several million people were uprooted and forced to move to different regions, all the ethnic purification the surrounding countries. A very high death rate among the expellees resulted early on in part because the Soviets wanted to rush through this massive transfer of human beings so as to prevent a fait accompli to the Allies at Yalta. In any case, the rigors of waiting for trains and then making a trip in war torn Poland took many weeks of privations and near starvation, and subjection to theft and violence from Soviet soldiers and Polish thieves alike.\textsuperscript{20} In the end, about 1.25 million Poles from the Kresy Wschodnie made it to the West, and about half a million Ukrainians were resettled in lands east of the border. Ukrainian resistance to being resettled from their homes to the Soviet Union led to harsh measures. Russian internal security troops and a Polish counterpart, the Korpus Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego (KBW), the
Internal Security Corps, constituted to fight internal foes, like the remnants of the Home Army and the Ukrainian nationalist fighting force, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).  

The experience of Polish "settlers" "repatriated" from eastern Poland was characteristically harsh, the background of the "transfer" was an atmosphere of ethnic brutality by Poles, Soviets, and Nazis almost continually since 1934 in some cases. The new regime was sponsored by the Soviets, and the local internal troops or sometimes assisting partisans were not likely to handle such masses of people with kid gloves. Then, after having lost family members to ethnic violence, after having lived in fear, after perhaps having spouses, sons, or mothers deported to the Gulags, many individuals suffered near total expropriation, to be set down in an unfamiliar land among unfamiliar neighbors, with the necessity of starting over.

The new "regained territories" of western Poland were also repopulated from several other sources. Hundreds of thousands of Poles from ruined towns and villages in central Poland were also transferred to Western Poland. All this was played out against a background of official and paramilitary violence and retribution. Up until 1943, the Ukrainians—sponsored by the German occupiers—had persecuted and slaughtered Poles. From the end of 1943, even before the German retreat, local Poles formed paramilitary bands for retribution of the most violent sort. The violence continued and in some ways helped justify the expulsion of the Germans and the forced migration of Ukrainians and Lemkos. As Orest Subtelny has commented, the "exchanges" of populations and civil strife in the Ukrainian-Polish borderlands were "part of a broader forced migration process that was also causing the expulsion of national minorities, primarily Germans, from Eastern European countries."

The last stage of moving people around like matches was an official action of forced migration called Akcja Wistula, Operation Vistula. This military operation during the summer of 1947 targeted continuing Ukrainian resistance in the southeastern Poland, the broader assumption being that the whole Ukrainian population was facilitating this resistance. The campaign was organized along military lines and with both military units and internal troops from Poland, the U.S.S.R., and Czechoslovakia—about 18,000 troops in all, including air support. Between April 29 and July 31, 1947, these troops converged on the area, surrounding each Ukrainian village in turn, giving the inhabitants a few hours to prepare for departure. After being marched to a gathering center, they were transported by boxcar or truck to distribution centers in towns set up for it: among others, Warsaw, Lublin, and Oświęcim (Auschwitz). They were then settled in the "regained territories." Polish authorities then quite deliberately settled these 140,000 individuals in as scattered a fashion as possible in these lands.

At the heart of the matchstick solution is the specific shifting of populations: the cleansing of Germans from Western Poland and the forced removal of several different regional Polish groups to take the place of the cleansed Germans. In light of the terrible background of
ethnic violence in wartime Poland, what were these experiences like for the victims?

Well, they were very much like a collage of all the other cases of ethnic violence during the war. The German population in the West suffered mass rape, torture, death from exposure, being drowned, being beaten, seeing family members killed, working at forced labor, long-term concentration camp living. This experience could extend to all ages.

Was this all revenge against Germans who had terrorized Poland? A recent account by a survivor is that of Martha Kent, who spent her over four years as a prisoner in Poland, first doing the work of a farmhand, later in the concentration camp of Potulice. The family was German but had no ties to Germany: they came from a city deep in Poland. The victim could not only not have voted for Hitler: she could not have voted at all, since she was only six years old when she did her first forced labor. She was transferred to a Potulice concentration camp, where she lived until her release and expulsion in 1949. She was ten years old.26

Were the victims sometimes not so innocent? Were there ethnic Germans in Poland who had been enthusiasts for the Lebensraum vision? Of course there were. If German refugee children who froze to death on the trek of January 1945 had fathers who were elsewhere fighting as convinced Nazis, does this fact downgrade the status of the children as victims? What about Ukrainians in southeastern Poland who collaborated with the Germans and used the protection of the occupiers to inflict vicious retribution on local Poles, later to be retaliated against in kind, and still later either "repatriated" to Gulags in the USSR, or compelled to leave property behind and settle in the new Polish west and north? As Jan Gross has pointed out, one can be both victim and victimizer. More often, of course, our study of all these situations shows that the victims on one side were fairly rarely also victimizers themselves—or rather they were victimizers only if we adopt a kind of totalitarian doctrine of collective guilt.

A knowledge of the deep background to the matchstick solution should not, I think, leave us with some kind of existentialist truism that all have sinned and all have been sinned against. Yet it does tell us something of the monotony of human brutality. During the war, Waldemar Lotnik was a Polish teenager near the Ukrainian border who got involved in a horrifyingly vicious neighbor-versus-neighbor ethnic war against local Ukrainians and their paramilitary formations: burning, rape, torture, murder. Lotnik's collaborator in getting his memoirs on paper, Julian Preece, ended Lotnik's memoir with a postscript from the 1990s, when Lotnik sees some televised scenes of Bosnian Serb violence against Bosnian Muslims. Preece records:

After seeing on television the charred remains of victims dragged from dug-outs in their gardens, Waldemar remembered how he had come across similar scenes. Whole families of Poles or Ukrainians tried to save themselves by hiding in holes they had dug themselves, covering the entrances to these makeshift shelters with branches and undergrowth. They hoped that their attackers would assume that they had fled and would burn down their houses before moving off in pursuit. That way
they lost their homes but saved themselves. But the attackers grew wise to this tactic, sought out the dug-outs by trampling through the gardens and hurled in a hand-grenade or riddled the huddled victims with bullets. What happened then, in 1944 in the county of Lublin, was happening now again in ex-Yugoslavia... 

A comparative study of ethnic violence and death in Poland in the World War II should at least begin by putting the experiences of the millions of victims on the same qualitative phase. One thing this approach can remind us is that one could experience a similar range of violent experiences during Poland during the war period whether one was Polish, Ukrainian, German, etc. There may be an exception in the factory death experience of Jews killed by Germans and their auxiliaries, but forced removal from home and homeland, mass murder, and the concentration camp experience were not experiences limited to Jews. On the contrary these experiences were shared by Poles, Ukrainians, Germans, Lemkos, and others.

In his book Neighbors, Jan Gross, having examined the massacre of Jews in the Polish town of Jeddawne, makes a comment pertinent to the subject at hand: "Of course, indispensable preconditions were prior brutalization of interpersonal relations, demoralization, and a general license to use violence. But these were exactly the methods employed and the mechanisms put in place by both occupiers." To extend this line of reasoning, one might say that the internal brutalization wrought by the occupation regimes and the external changes of borders worked out over drinks in Teheran do not tell the whole story of ethnic violence, but they set the stage, both for the catastrophe and for our understanding of it.


See Pavel Polian, Against Their Will: The History and Geography of Forced Migrations in the USSR (Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, 2004), 115-119.


For an overview, see Włodzimierz Borodziej and Klaus Ziemer, Deutsch-polnische Beziehungen 1939—1945—1949: Eine Einführung (Osnabrück: fibre Verlag, 2000), esp, the Introduction by Borodziej.


24 Subtelny, "Expulsion, Settlement, Civil Strife," 155.


