World War I and the Emergence of Ethnic Cleansing in Europe

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Ethnic cleansing and other processes for manipulating, eradicating, or moving large populations are age-old.[1] At least by the end of the second millennium B.C., Mesopotamian regimes had adopted complex and gruesome techniques for "cleansing" recalcitrant or inconvenient groups of people, and similar techniques have reemerged at many points in time and space since then. Yet the twentieth century produced substantial developments in the history of population manipulation. Obviously, the ability of the twentieth-century state to displace or eradicate much larger numbers of people—by use of both new technologies and new modes of organization—presents a truly significant change. Moreover, at the moment of the state's enhanced abilities in this area, a new doctrine of nationalism based on an almost biological concept which we might call the "ethnic state" helped bring about new ways of identifying the target segment of a given state's population. Taken together, technological and conceptual changes seem to have created a new variation of the ancient process of population manipulation. If we consider the changes both in terms of nature and of scope, we might even call the twentieth-century ethnic cleansing a whole new phenomenon.[2]

In many ways, the emergence of a specific form of population manipulation—that is, mass removal or killing of groups based on ethnic status—in Europe in the early twentieth century seems anomalous. Restrictions upon the cruelty of governments, espe-

[1] I will use the term "ethnic cleansing" to mean any attempt to remove a given group defined in part or in whole by ethnicity from a specific area. Hence, transfer or removal might, in theory, relatively calm process, but given the attachment of most individuals to their property, home, and homeland, violence—or at the very least the open threat of it—will be an integral part of the process. At worst, of course, murder and other direct violence might accompany the process of ethnic cleansing. Some terms with a more neutral patina—like "forced migration," or "forced population transfer"–do not express the targeting mechanism of "ethnic cleansing."

[2] Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, *Ethnic Cleansing* (New York, 1996), 1-27; Norman Naimark, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, Mass., 2001), 1-16. Another view of the origins and nature of twentieth-century ethnic cleansing is Philipp Ther, "A Century of Forced Migration: The Origins and Consequences of 'Ethnic Cleansing,'" in *Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944-1948*, ed. Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak (Lanham, Md., 2001), 43-72.

cially in wartime, had been greatly tightened by the time of the nineteenth century, and thoughtful people in the European world envisioned even more amelioration of the tradtionally harsh ways of government. Indeed, to some extent a tendency toward the control of cruelty in war also seemed to "civilize" politics, international affairs, and ethnic relations. Further, the extraordinary practical individualism which marked modern Europe worked against forced removal of anyone, since the high value placed on property as an individual right made it seem the more atrocious to drive individuals away from property in which or on which they lived, or with which they had "mingled their labor," as John Locke put it. One does well not to exaggerate, but even if it was not a golden age of ethnic relations, liberal Europe—the Europe of the mid-nineteenth century—nonetheless thought it had seen the last of many of the past's cruel norms, including the forced removal of "undesirable" people.

Even in wartime, the killing of noncombatants and the destruction of their property were increasingly deplored and where possible punished. Rape, pillage, and murder occurred in all Napoleonic-era armies, for example, but it is significant that commanders like Wellington expended much time and effort in enforcing more civilized behavior among their troops.[3] Patterns of wartime behavior became still more subject to codification and control from the period after the 1860s, when European states created elaborate "rules" of warfare, many of which were aimed at protecting noncombatants and limiting war's destructiveness. Enlightenment teachings against cruelty in wars and punishments had helped create a Europe in which egregious cruelty was much less frequent than in previous centuries, and in which, as modern scholarship has shown, both the level of violence and the total number of deaths from war—military and civilian—had declined.[4]

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[3] See Gordon Corrigan, *Wellington: A Military Life* (Hambledon and London, 2001). A case of rape during the Napoleon's Russian campaign and a harsh punishment for the crime is described in Heinrich von Brandt, *In the Legions of Napoleon*, trans. and ed. Jonathan North (London, 1999). 101; on the subject, see as well p. 192.

[4] For an overview and analysis of the quantitative literature on levels of violence, see Johan M. G. van der Dennen, "On War: Concepts, Definitions, Data: A Review of the Macroquantitative Research Literature up to 1980," prepared for the course "Political Violence," Interuniversity Center for Postgraduate Studies, Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, January 1980 (Internal Publication of the Polemological Institute, Groningen, and published online by the Centrum voor Recht & ICT, at http://rint.rechten.rug.nl/rth/dennen/unesco1.htm (accessed 29 July 2002); see also A. J. Jongman and J.M.G. van der Dennen, "The Great 'War Figures' Hoax: An Investigation in Polemomythology," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 19 (1988): 197-203.

Yet in the period of World War I, strictures against violence directed at noncombatants eroded rapidly, and violence against civilians, both enemy and friendly, rose sharply.[5] Indeed, European governments justified violence against civilians at home increasingly in terms of the war effort abroad, much as radical Jacobins called on Parisian revolutionaries to move against "the enemy within" in September 1792. One measure of this twentieth–century "preemptive" violence against domestic enemies was the driving of whole communities and even populations—if identified as enemies—from their homes and preferably out of the country. This practice grew to such an extent just before and during World War I as to make the massive population transfers of the Lausanne Treaty in 1923 appear to be a kind of practical norm, acceptable not only to the governments directly involved, but suitable also to the rest of the European powers. A sea-change had occurred.[6]

Where do we look when searching for the causes and conditions which led to such a change, a change which seemed to reverse a trend of the civilizing tendencies reaching back to the seventeenth century? I propose to comment on the genesis of modern population politics by discussing six "theses." Underpinning these theses, and to some extent tying them together, is a series of historical observations, in short form as follows. Since the rise of the modern state in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the state's monopoly of violence has been associated with the internal security of the state's population. States have likewise tended to identify as war even the domestic use of state violence.[7] State violence, or the threat of it, is crucial in manipulating specific "domestic" population groups. Since population groups within a country must be identified and defined, it has been the habit of nation-states

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[5] I am positing a rise in violence both from the standpoint of expanding the pools of potential targets (see, for example, William R. Hawkins, "Imposing Peace: Total vs. Limited Wars, and the Need to Put Boots on the Ground," *Parameters*, Summer 2000, 72-73) and from the standpoint of the enormous rise of civilian casualties from the nineteenth century to the twentieth. See also Dennen, "On War"; and R. J. Rummel, *Death By Government* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1994), especially chapters 1 and 2. See also the wide–ranging discussion by Mark Levene, "Why is the Twentieth Century the Century of Genocide?" J*ournal of World History* 11 (2000): 305–336.

[6] This change is examined in Irving Louis Horowitz, *Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power*, 5th ed. (New Brunswick, N.J., 2002).

[7] This is clear from Machiavelli's *The Prince* and from Hobbes's careful depiction of the limitation of war to the status of being state-controlled in *Leviathan*. See the excellent recent discussion of this issue, including the significant aspect of the rise of police "forces," in Martin van Creveld, *The Rise of the State* (Cambridge, 1999), 155-188.

since early in their history to define the targeted population as "enemies" in some way. Hence, the treatment of noncombatants in wartime is closely related to the state's treatment of targeted internal "enemies."[8]

Thesis One

Some of the most atrocious European cases of ethnic cleansing, forced migration, and even mass murder since World War I have been associated with new borders or with minorities living in a borderland. In the fifty years before World War I, Central and Western European regimes dealt with many issues related to ethnic minorities. Many of these problems concerned new minorities resulting from wake-of-war boundary changes, precisely the situation which in the twentieth century tended to lead to violence and often ethnic cleansing. Yet *until the eve of the First World War, the European international system and Europe's domestic regimes tended to work out the related problems of ethnic minorities and changing borders within a non-violent framework, except in Southeastern Europe.*

We can look, for example, at the arrangements made in the wake of the first two wars of German unification (1864 and 1866). Denmark lost all of Schleswig-Holstein in the 1864 war, and the northern duchy of Schleswig was ceded to Prussia without regard to the strong Danish majority of the population in the north of the region. About a hundred thousand ethnic Danes were thus brought under the Prussian state and later the German Empire. The Treaty of Prague, which ended the Austro-Prussian War in 1866, allowed for this Prussian annexation of territory, but on the condition that a plebiscite would take place in the northern districts—called South Jutland by the Danes and North Schleswig by the Germans—before the Prussians took over, and that a Danish referendum victory would mean that this northern territory would remain Danish.

The Prussians quickly carried out annexation without a plebiscite. The Danish government protested, and Prussia went through the motions of arranging for a plebiscite after the fact, but the negotiations eventually foundered. Later, in 1878, when Austria-Hungary needed German support in connection with the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Germans took advantage of the

[8] For critiques of the state's monopoly of violence and the manipulation of populations, see Ludwig von Mises, *Nation, State and Economy*, trans. Leland Yeager (New York, 1983 [orig. published in German, 1919]); Horowitz, *Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power*; Creveld, *The Rise of the State*.

situation to extract from Austria a clause in the Treaty of Vienna which released the Germans from the obligation to hold a referendum in North Schleswig. Just after Prussian takeover, some 60,000 Danes had emigrated (opted) to go either to Denmark or elsewhere, many of them young men avoiding the Prussian military draft. When the Treaty of Prague provided for a plebiscite, many of these "optants" moved back to Germany, though without German or Prussian citizenship. For these "optants," 1878 meant being stuck in Germany, though without German citizenship.[9] Still, though many observers viewed this episode as a shabby one, and though this ethnic injustice was compounded from the 1880s onward by Prussian policies of Germanization, no violence marred any of these events. No Danes lost their property; indeed, because of German development, property values of even the Danish farmers tended to rise.[10]

In the famous case of Alsace-Lorraine, newly united Germany, fresh from the victory of the Franco-Prussian War in 1871, incorporated a region whose inhabitants spoke a German dialect. Yet if the Alsatians were theoretically ethnic confreres, their dialect and their commitment to Germandom were seen as problematic at best throughout the period from 1871 to 1918. Governed from Berlin, the region displayed much low-level dissatisfaction. Still, even in the worst cases of friction—and the worst were various clashes between civilians and army officers stemming from harsh treatment of Alsatian army recruits—the German government not only apologized for the behavior of the army officers, but even outlawed the use of a particular ethnic epithet in the army.[11]

We find even less violence when we turn to other multiethnic regions of Central and Western Europe. Though not the result of any recent border changes, the eastern borderlands of Germany exhibited many tensions which had the potential of turning violent. This region would, as well, come to be closely related to some of the major outbreaks of ethnic cleansing in the mid-twentieth century. Here, in a borderland characterized by a large Polish

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[9] Sarah Wambaugh, *Plebiscites Since the Great War*, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1933), 1: 49-52.

[10] Niels Hansen, "L'évolution de la politique nationale en Slesvig de 1806 à 1918," in *Manuel historique de la question du Slesvig 1906-1938* (Copenhagen and Paris, 1939), 4-5; the so-called Optant Treaty is printed in the same work, 62-63.

[11] Jena M. Gaines, "The Politics of National Identity in Alsace," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 21 (1994): 99–109. See also the comments of the German Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, in *Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstages*, 1913-1914, 291: 6155-58.

population, ethnic tension between Germans and ethnic Poles grew from the 1880s onward. From that time debates in the German *Reichstag* and the Prussian Parliament and German press repeatedly tried to clarify the status of Polish-speaking "Germans." From the eighties, the Prussian administration discriminated in both open and secret ways against Poles in the civil service, in school matters, and in many other areas. Some violence pitted ethnic Poles against the police in the prewar years, and some of the strikes of the Polish unions looked very much like ethnic conflict, since especially in the industrial section of Upper Silesia, the work force was predominantly of Polish ethnicity. Even the German Socialist Party, the SPD, withdrew its affiliation from the Polish Socialist Party, claiming that the true allegiance of the Polish socialists was to Poland rather than socialism. Further, a Polish nationalist party gained enough votes to send deputies to the German *Reichstag* in 1903. In some ways, ethnic conflict underlay much of public life in the east, and many Prussian subjects of Polish extraction were no doubt reevaluating their own identity as "Polish Germans" long before the First World War.[12]

These eastern borderlands of Germany were also the scene of vigorous activity by both state and private interests to settle more German farmers in the border areas, efforts usually called the Settlement Movement. The process involved buying out the Polish owners, or buying out penurious German nobles and selling at low prices to German "settlers" from elsewhere. No force or violence was involved, but the overtones of this Germanizing movement are obvious, and the movement itself was associated with "integral nationalist" and Social Darwinist writers from that period who were quite vocal in their anti-Semitism and racialist ideology.[13]

Similar patterns may be discerned in other Central and Western European areas: tension, especially as various minorities "awakened" to their identity in the nineteenth century, but no large-scale violence. This generalization would hold for the Catalonian movement and similar ethnic movements in the West as well as throughout the Habsburg Empire, whose congeries of nationalities jostled with each other but mostly avoided violence,

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[12] Richard Blanke, *Prussian Poland in the German Empire, 1871-1900* (Boulder, Col., 1981); Laurence Schofer, *The Formation of a Modern Labor Force: Upper Silesia, 1865–1914* (Berkeley, 1975); T. Hunt Tooley, *National Identity and Weimar Germany: Upper Silesia and the Eastern Border, 1918-1922* (Lincoln, Neb., 1997), 1–23.

[13] See Richard Wonsor Tims, *Germanizing the Poles: The H-K-T Society of the Eastern Marches, 1994-1914* (New York, 1941).

overseen by a monarchy whose "live and let live" policies aimed for anything but violent confrontation.[14]

In non-Habsburg Southeastern Europe, the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in the course of the nineteenth century led to the emergence of new states with new borders. It was at the same time home to many, often intermingling, ethnic groups and to increasing tensions and fears that minority populations might sympathize with the "enemy." The creation of the new states was usually violent, and the wars which accompanied these events were brutal. The accelerated changes resulting from the Russian defeat of the Turks in the 1870s war necessitated decisions about all border and minority-related issues, as groups of people found themselves in new states, often as a part of a minority. At the same time, the Ottoman government responded to secession and the threat of it with terror and violence against specific groups, measures which made the Ottoman regime famous throughout Europe for a number of "massacres." As papers in this volume demonstrate, Balkan states likewise moved in many cases against their Muslim populations (often called "Turks") as well, driving out and slaughtering large numbers. As a result of the Balkan Wars of 1912/13, the competing neighboring states in the Balkans did even more to clear up their borders in the ethnic sense.[15]

When faced with ethnic tensions resulting from changed borders before World War I, Central and Western European states tended to normalize relations without violence, even if the minorities in question still had grievances. In Southeastern Europe, border changes stemming from the Russo–Turkish conflict of the 1870s generated massacres, displacement, and other elements we would identify as behaviors related to ethnic cleansing. Overall, outbreaks of violence were rare until just before 1914.

Thesis Two

In spite of the "humaneness" of most European governments in dealings with undesired populations, the level of violent solutions to unwanted populations began to rise slowly after 1870. Most of the cases that consti-

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[14] István Deák, *Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps, 18148-1918* (New York, 1992).

[15] André Gerolymatos, *The Balkan wars: Conquest, Revolution, and Retribution from the Ottoman Era to the Twentieth Century and Beyond* (New York, 2002); Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars, 1912-1913: Prelude to the First World War* (London, 2000); in the present volume, see below, Dennis P. Hupchick, "'Bulgarian 'Turks': A Muslim Minority in a Christian Nation-State."

tuted this slow acceleration of violence occurred on "peripheries" of Europe. All of these cases were related to nationalism and empire.

Some striking exceptions to the policies and atmosphere of "humaneness" emerged late in the nineteenth century, especially in peripheries of the European continent itself, and in the various European overseas empires. This behavior could be aimed at religious minorities, but increasingly by the end of the century, violent population politics seemed to be focused on ethnic minorities and took place in the western and southern zones of the Russian Empire, in the European components of the Ottoman Empire, and in neighboring states in Southeastern Europe.

The mid-1880s seems to have formed a watershed in the reversal of the civilizing processes of the Enlightenment when it came to governmental solutions to minority problems. Throughout Europe, one might argue, during this crucial decade a new and hardcore variety of ethnic nationalism moved to the center stage of policy-making. In the Russian Empire, repressive nationalistic policies by Alexander II were already in the works by the time of his assassination in 1881 (especially in Poland and Ukraine). The eighties signaled the beginning of the Russification program on most of the peripheries of the Russian Empire. These policies were promoted by the famous official of church and state, K. P. Pobedonostsev, and aimed at both ethnic and religious minorities. Plans for the Jews played a very significant part in the Russification program. As Pobedonostsev declared: "One-third will die out, one-third will become assimilated with the Orthodox population, and one-third will emigrate."[16]

In the European segments of the Ottoman Empire, too, the last decades of the nineteenth century seemed to foreshadow the violent ethnic politics of the twentieth. The most famous victims of Ottoman state policy in this period were the Bulgarians and Armenians, who from the eighties on were experiencing violent pressure from the Ottoman regime under the harsh Sultan Abdul Hamid II. This pressure (including periodic "massacres") certainly began to look something like ethnic cleansing. In the recently independent states in the Balkans, the two Balkan wars of 1912-13 produced the first clear-cut ethnic cleansing in twentieth-century Europe as the competing nationalities in the areas broken off from the Ottoman Empire fought each other and the Ottomans to satisfy their national pride. In this process, belligerents tried to remove persons of one ethnicity from a given region in order to justify con-

[16] David MacKenzie and Michael W. Curran, *A History of Russia, the Soviet Union, and Beyond*, 4th ed. (Belmont, Cal., 1993), 400-402.

trol over it on ethnic grounds. Hence, the European zone that gave the twentieth century its last ethnic cleansings in the 1990s, also gave it its first cases.[17]

Another periphery of both Europe and empire at this period pointed toward brutality in dealing with unwanted populations. The "new imperialist" colonies formed a different kind of imperial periphery, but a periphery nonetheless. Certainly on this periphery, Europeans practiced widespread violent manipulation of populations. It is worth contemplating that the "New Imperialism" of European powers (the new-style political control of overseas empires in the last third of the century) coincided precisely with the chronological framework of the new, hard-shelled, one might say Social Darwinistic, nationalism. Indeed, connections between imperial conquest and domestic militarism, cruelty, or authoritarianism constituted one of the central tenets of the anti-imperialist movement in Europe and the United States.[18] American historian Carlton J. H. Hayes suggested some very direct connections between overweening nationalism and imperial cruelty in his classic history of Europe during this period, *An Age of Materialism*.[19] Certainly, if we are looking for cases which combine the inflicting of violence and death on given populations for the purpose of "cleansing" a given area, we find a great many such cases "on the ground" in overseas empires of the European Great Powers.[20]

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[17] See citations in note 15, above.

[18] See, for example, Booker T. Washington, "Cruelty in the Congo Country," *The Outlook* 78 (Oct. 8, 1904); Henry Van *Dyke The American Birthright and the Philippine Pottage: A Sermon Preached on Thanksgiving Day, 1898* (New York, n.d. [1898]); Anti-Imperialist League, "Platform of the American Anti-Imperialist League," given in Carl Schurz, *The Policy of Imperialism*, Liberty Tract No. 4 (Chicago, 1899). On the Anti-Imperialist League, see Jim Zwick, "The Anti-Imperialist League: A Brief Organizational History" [http://www.boondocksnet.com/ail/ailhist.html]; and Jim Zwick, ed., *Anti-Imperialism in the United States, 1898-1935* [http://www.boondocksnet.com/ail98-35.html (Feb. 24, 2001)]. On the concentration camps, see Brian McAllister Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902* (Chapel Hill, 1989), 25-37, 154-169.

[19] Carlton J. H. Hayes, *A Generation of Materialism, 1871-1900* (New York, 1941).

[20] My approach to this thesis was greatly stimulated by an April 2000 discussion on population politics and empire on the email list "Forced Migration History List" (Listowner, Nick Baron) FORCED-MIGRATION-HISTORY@ JISCMAIL.AC.UK, an email discussion list associated with the project "Population Displacement, State-Building and Social Identity in the Lands of the Former Russian Empire, 1918-1930" at the University of Manchester (http://www.art.man.ac.uk/ HISTORY/ahrbproj/details.htm). I am grateful to Jeff Handmaker, Jonathan Bone, and Peter Holquist for their comments and analysis in this discussion.

Since its beginning European imperialism had found it necessary to move various groups to various places: American Indians to Spanish farms and mines, or Africans to sites of intensive agriculture, etc. In the same way, European colonial empires had likewise killed off or driven away populations so as to use their land, though in many regions of the world, disease proved to be a much more efficient "ethnic cleanser."

One important tool for carrying out such tasks, and one that would become central to nearly all subsequent cases of ethnic cleansing and genocide, was the concentration camp. The late-nineteenth-century burst of large-scale imperialist conquest and war made it essential to control populations, identify enemies, separate certain subgroups from each other, and hold groups together for disposal. At some point, the technology of barbed wire, a cheap and easily used product invented in the United States in the 1870s to fence in cattle, offered itself as a cheap and practical way of fencing in human beings.

This new use of barbed wire seems to have been applied first by the Spanish Army while fighting the Cuban insurrection. The Spanish forces were apparently using barbed wire to help section off the island of Cuba by the mid-1890s. In 1896/97 the newly appointed governor, General Valeriano Weyler, adopted something like the reverse of what the term "concentration camp" would later denote. Spanish soldiers rounded up some 300,000 Cuban civilians in the attempt to divide the peaceful Cubans from the insurgents. His idea was to feed and protect the "good" civilians in what were called "reconcentration camps," though his plans for providing food and shelter seem to have been very inadequate. In the event, over thirty percent of the those "reconcentrated"—upwards of a hundred thousand people—starved or died of disease.[21]

During the Boer War (1899-1902), the British Army used barbed wire enclosures to create "concentration camps" more closely approximating the modern meaning of the term: the enclosures were used for imprisoning Boer (South Africans of Dutch descent) women and children so that the Boer guerilla fighters, the *kommandos*, would surrender. General Roberts (Frederick Lord Roberts) originally initiated the system in 1900, partly as a response to the growing number of refugees resulting from the British attempt to starve the Boers out by burning their homes (some 30,000 of them), partly with the idea of using the incarceration of Boer women and children to force the Boers to stop fighting. The British built some forty concentration camps, containing

[21] Sebastian Balfour, *The End of the Spanish Empire, 1898–1923* (Oxford, 1997), 13ff.

about 116,000 prisoners, most of them women and children. Starvation and diseases stemming from unhygienic conditions killed enormous numbers of these "inmates." Over about a year and half, just under 30,000 Afrikaners died, 22,000 of them children under sixteen. Of a total Boer population of about 200,000, fifteen percent died, and the disproportionate mortality level among young people presents a genuine demographic catastrophe. Contemporary arguments that the local mortality rates were normally high do not account for a death rate this high. Perhaps less known, well over a hundred thousand black Africans, at this juncture forming an "inconvenient" population which found itself wandering and homeless because the British "scorched earth" policy, were likewise rounded up into concentration camps. Over 14,000 died of disease and poor conditions, about 12,000 of those children.[22]

At about the same time, the United States launched into full-fledged imperialism in the Philippines (as a result of the Spanish-American War, 1898), taking the vast area from Spain and imposing its rule on the local peoples. In the ensuing resistance, American commanders (some of them veterans of American "Indian wars" aimed at the expulsion of specific groups of Indians) carried out a "dirty" war against Filipino forces, in the end losing about 5,000 troops against an enormous death toll of over 200,000 Filipino deaths. In the course of this war of conquest and "pacification," General Jacob Smith, a "veteran" of the Wounded Knee Massacre in 1890, sent to a subordinate the order: "I want no prisoners, I wish you to kill and burn, the more you kill and burn the better it will please me. I want all persons killed who are capable of bearing arms (ten years of age and above) in actual hostilities against the United States." He emphasized what might be called the demographic function of his mission: "The interior of Samar must be made a howling wilderness."[23] Smith was later court-martialled, but American efforts throughout the war of conquest and the subsequent "pacification" were consistent with Smith's behavior. General Leonard Wood ordered an attack on six hundred Moros huddling in a crater in the mountains, fugitives from new taxes being collected by the United States. After the "battle," he reported that all were killed: men, women, and children. Concentration camps made their appearance here too, again constructed from the practi-

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[22] S. B. Spies, "Women in the War," in *The South African War: The Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902*, ed. Peter Warwick (New York, 1980), 161-185; Peter Warwick, "Black People and the War" in *The South African War*, 186-209.

[23] Steven M. Gillon and Cathy D. Matson, *The American Experiment* (Boston, 2002), 864-865.

cal technology of barbed wire, at about the same time that the British were employing them in South Africa.[24]

Slightly later, in the "protectorate" of German Southwest Africa, later to become Northern Namibia, the German government was directly involved in "cleansing" areas of the Herero people, whose revolt against German colonizers had left several hundred German settlers dead. To deal with the problem, Berlin sent General Adolf Lebrecht von Trotha, a soldier known for his inflexible and draconian policies in German East Africa and in China during the Boxer Rebellion, a war in which the Kaiser had enjoined his officers to act like "Huns." Sent to chastise the Hereros, Trotha commented upon his arrival in 1904: "I know the tribes of Africa.... They only respond to force. It was and is my policy to use force with terrorism and even brutality. I shall annihilate the tribes in revolt with streams of blood and streams of gold. Only after a complete uprooting will something emerge." In October 1904 he issued an order along the lines of Smith's: "Every Herero found within German borders, with or without guns, with or without livestock, will be shot. I will not give shelter to any Herero women or children. They must return to their people, or they will be shot." No male prisoners were to be taken. Women and children were to be harried into the wasteland. His army followed these orders and in the process killed outright or by starvation between 50,000 and 70,000 Hereros.[25]

Since classical times, commentators on imperial systems have insisted that the behavior of empires on its extremities tends to affect the behavior of the imperial government toward its home base. Hence, if we are looking for links between ethnic cleansing and large-scale violence, or even mass killing, we should look to the peripheries of the European (and other Western) imperialist states of the late nineteenth century. To connect such ideas with conceptions of violence discussed below, it is worth noting that

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[24] See Helen C. Wilson, *Reconcentration in the Philippines* (Boston [Anti-Imperialist League pamphlet], 1906); reproduced on the web by Jim Zwick at http://www.boondocksnet.com/ai/ailtexts/wilson060121.html as a component of Jim Zwick, ed., "Anti-Imperialism in the United States," 1898-1935. http://www.boondocksnet.com/ai/ (Aug. 30, 2002).

[25] Jon Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros* (Berkeley, 1981); Günther Spraul, "Der Völkermord an den Herero: Untersuchungen zu einer neuen Kontinuitätsthese," *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* 12 (1988): 713-739. See also Jon Bridgman and Leslie J. Worley, "Genocide of the Hereros," in *Genocide in the Twentieth Century: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts*, ed. Samuel Totten, William S. Parsons, and Israel W. Charny (New York, 1995), 3-48. For the official view, see *Die Kämpfe der deutschen Truppen in Südwestafrika*, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1906-1907).

almost all commanding generals in the First World War—Joffre, Falkenhayn, Pershing, and many others—had spent part of their careers planning and carrying out colonial wars.[26]

Thesis Three

Even the new rules of war allowed combatants to commit violence against enemy civilians in the enemy's country under some circumstances (spying, guerilla or non–uniformed combat, and some other cases). If a state could kill or forcibly move civilian enemies in another country, the existence of "enemies" at home meant that the state should be able to kill or forcibly remove these enemies as well. In countries where the definition of citizenship became increasingly connected with belonging to a given ethnic group, members of ethnic minorities could become classified as enemies and therefore targets of ethnic cleansing.[27] The classic example of this process of "defining" domestic ethnic enemies is of course the Holocaust,[28] in the beginning stages of which various offices of the SS went to extraordinary lengths to define exactly who was a Jew. Yet this process had gone on less rigorously in many places in East Central Europe. It was a process closeley associated with the origins and practice of ethnic cleansing. At the same time, legal norms of warfare sanctioned violence against civilians in warfare only if the enemy civilians jeopardized their non–combatant status. In cases of ethnic cleansing, twentieth–century states have had to assume that all members of a given minority were enemies by virtue of their ethnicity. Moving against these enemies violently then became a matter of course. *Twentieth-century ethnic cleansing hinged on the related processes of defining ethnic minorities as legally different from the majority and of declaring members of the defined minority as internal enemies of the nation. Therefore, the standards of European behavior toward external enemies of the nation, especially the civilian or noncombatant enemy populations,*

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[26] See the essays in Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen, eds., *After Empire: Multi-Ethnic Societies and Nation-Building* (Boulder, Co., 1997), 102.

[27] Especially instructive here is Bell-Fialkoff's chapter, "Cleansing as a Metonym of Collective Identity," in *Ethnic Cleansing, 57-115.*

[28] Omer Bartov discusses this issue as it relates to the Holocaust in "Defining Enemies, Making Victims: Germans, Jews, and the Holocaust," *American Historical Review* 103 (June 1998): 771–786; Raul Hilberg deals with the question extensively in *Destruction of the European Jews*, 3 vols., rev. ed. (New York, 1985).

becomes a central issue in the history of the emergence of ethnic cleansing.

After the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), and partly as a result of its horrific brutality, European states began to work out a number of agreements—some written, some tacit—aimed at ameliorating the disastrous effects of war on noncombatants. The eighteenth-century Enlightenment spurred on such developments, so that while armies became larger throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and while weapons became more powerful, many of the dreadful consequences of war for noncombatants were lessened.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, European powers entered into a number agreements which would, it was hoped, regulate war even more strictly, adding more protections for civilians, regulating conditions for prisoners of war, and the like. In the 1860s European powers ratified the Geneva Convention, addressing many of these issues, and the Hague Declarations signed by most powers between 1899 and 1907 further "civilized" the prosecution of war, at least in theory. Certainly, even general anecdotal evidence from nineteenth-century wars shows that for whatever reasons, European powers tried to play according to a fairly strict set of rules with regard to civilian populations, at least European populations.

Yet on the sharp edges of empire, civilians could indeed be redefined as fair objects of violence even if they had not engaged in the explicit guerilla behavior proscribed by international agreement. In war on the edges of the great overseas empires, it was relatively easy for Europeans to see "the brown people" as fair game, since Social Darwinist modes of thinking tended to dehumanize them in any event. In the setting of empire in non–European territories, we can also trace a process in which European powers interpreted the relatively new international rules of warfare and protection of individuals in such a way as to redefine civilian populations of the enemies as in a sense outside the rules of civilized warfare, as refractory and hidden "enemies." We see this redefinition most directly in connection with irregular warfare.

The new international regulations were quite strict about defining combatants as those in uniform.[29] This definition aimed at

[29] The Hague Convention annex entitled "Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land" included among its first regulations that combatants must "have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance" and would "carry arms openly"; Hague Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II), signed 29 July 1899, entry into force 4 Sept. 1900.

protecting civilian males not in military formation and therefore, like women and children, *hors de combat*. Still, by the same definitional logic, persons in civilian clothing who committed acts of war (ambush, sabotage, spying) were risking immediate execution, since this behavior was inimical to the agreed-upon system of European warfare. The 1899 Hague Convention regulations on land warfare were excplicit: irregular fighters could not be clearly identified on the battlefield as enemy troops and hence could be on either side, forcing uniformed soldiers to be more on guard and more trigger-happy when facing civilians. The irregular partisans or guerillas "hid" in the civilian population, making the population that "harbored" them seem guilty of harboring secret enemies. There was no way to ferret out irregular fighters or even identify them. And since these fighters had set aside the rules of "civilized warfare" by non-sanctioned fighting, the armies faced with such uncivilized behavior outside the law had no choice but to fight back with uncivilized behavior outside the law. Hence, if a region produced insurgents or guerillas, then the civilian population harboring and aiding those insurgents was fair game for reprisal, for removal, or for other means of control.

This whole line of reasoning is hardly new to the twentieth century. Irregular tactics emerged occasionally in eighteenth–century warfare, and the French Army had faced well-coordinated Spanish guerillas during the Peninsular War after 1808.[30] The French sometimes responded in the ways depicted in Goya's famous series of paintings about the war, in particular the shocking image of "The Execution of the Rebels 3rd May, 1808." At the end of the century, virtually at the moment of heightened hopes of "civilizing" warfare's cruelties toward civilian populations, European armies on imperial frontiers—as we have seen above—came to conclusions much to the disadvantage of civilians in wartime. Indeed, they emerged from the nineteenth century armed with definitions which multiplied the ways in which a population could put itself outside the rules of warfare and therefore, in a sense, "deserve" the consequences. The new definitions also multiplied the methods which could be used to control, police, and punish such large numbers of refractory enemy civilians.[31]

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[30] For a primary account of dealing with guerillas, see the excellent memoir by Heinrich von Brandt, *In the Legions of Napoleon: The Memoirs of a Polish Officer in Spain and Russia 1808-1813*, cited above.

[31] A good review of the American approach to the question is John M. Gates, "Indians and Insurrectos: The U.S. Army's Experience with Insurgency," *Parameters* 13 (1983), 59-68.

Armies put these definitions to use in enemy country during World War I. The Russian armies which surprised the Germans by bursting into East Prussia a few weeks into the war, far ahead of any schedule the Germans thought possible, carried on a grim kind of war, targeting civilian housing in particular, burning and looting on a very wide scale, and killing civilians, over 6,000 in the end. Probably most of those killed were regarded as "spies" or seemed to be giving other ununiformed help to their country's army. At the same time, and more famously, the German armies which invaded Belgium and France in August 1914 seemed so casual about making the calculation that the remedy for civilian resistance was terror and reprisal that historians have not yet decided whether the policy of terror or *Schrecklichkeit* trickled down from above or rose up from below. Here the water is muddied somewhat because of the well-known propaganda compendium called the Bryce Report, a commentary of German atrocities in Belgium issued in 1915. Much of the Bryce Report seems to have been fabricated, but some historians are now reexamining German violence against civilians in Belgium. One way or the other, over 6,000 Belgian civilians were killed by the Germans in roughly the same weeks that about the same number of Germans was being killed by the Russians. The property damage in Belgium, in the end, was less than that in East Prussia. The Germans burned almost 16,000 houses and buildings, almost all of this during the first month of the war, while the Russians destroyed some 42,000 buildings in East Prussia and damaged many more. Still, the Germans carried out the most senseless property crime of the war, when they systematically burned parts of the Belgian city of Louvain (Leuven), including one of the great libraries of Europe, that of the University of Louvain.[32]

In both Belgium and East Prussia, refugees fled from the approaching armies and from their depredations. From Belgium over a million people fled to Great Britain, France, or the Netherlands. The majority returned after German guarantees of safety, but some 300,000 Belgian refugees remained abroad. In East Prussia, two separate invasions by the Russians early in the war sent some 870,000 (out of a population of two million) Germans fleeing from the invading army. These were all housed in

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[32] E. H. Kossmann, *The Low Countries 1780-1940* (New York, 1978), 522-523; Robert B. Asprey, *The German High Command at War* (New York, 1991), 52. Significant studies of the issue of German atrocities are in John N. Horne and Alan Kramer, *Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial* (New Haven, 2001); and Trevor Wilson, "Lord Bryce's Investigation into Alleged German Atrocities in Belgium, 1914-1915," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 14 , no 3 (July 1979): 370.

Germany, but property destruction was so high that for the next years most had no place to live if they did return. Before the Russians were pushed out of German territory, they sent some 11,000 German civilians (predominantly women, children, and elderly men) to Siberia.[33]

The final connection between putting enemy populations outside the law and the emergence of ethnic cleansing within one's own borders involves a very short step. If a segment of one's own population, or a particular region, has likely connections (perhaps ethnic but not necessarily) with a regularly organized enemy army, then redefining this group as an enemy population is not difficult. If partisan fighting is involved in any way—or merely the threat or possibility of it—then this enemy population "within" can be set outside the bounds of law. All measures taken against them seem justified, even "terror," since upon these measures the winning or losing of the war could hang.[34]

Thesis Four

It has become a cliché of modern urban culture that violence seems to beget violence: and we might well transfer this unfortunate insight to thinking about mass brutality in the twentieth century. One place to look for the emergence of brutal population politics in twentieth-century Europe is on the battlefields of World War I. Another is in the ideological dictatorships that emerged during or as a result of the war. *World War I, its bloody battlefields, and its total war privations brought brutal violence closer to the core of normative or expected behavior. At the level of the state, the new "total war" regimes, in particular the Bolshevik regime, made mass violence and terror a routine instrument of policy.*

If warfare had become more controlled in many ways in the nineteenth century, European armies were nonetheless already drifting into a "modern" disregard for limitations of violence in the

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[33] Stephen Pope and Elizabeth-Anne Wheal, *The Dictionary of the First World War* (New York, 1995), 65. The East Prussian figure comes from an article by a German official who had been involved in the administrative provision of food and shelter for the East Prussian refugees: *Landesrat* Meyer [*sic*], "Die Flüchtlingsfürsorge," in *Der Wiederaufbau Ostpreussens: eine kulturelle, verwaltungstechnische und baukünstlerische Leistung*, ed. Erich Göttgen (Königsberg, 1928), 120. The introduction to the same book by Adolf von Batocki (pp. 11-15) also contains some useful material on the invasion. Batocki was the wartime and postwar *Oberpräsident* (governor) of East Prussia.

[34] Horne and Kramer discuss the "*franc tireur*," or irregular, issue intensively for the German case in *German Atrocities 1914*, 94-174.

early stages of the First World War. The fictional quality of the famous Bryce Report and other wartime propaganda aside, we have seen that the invading soldiers of both Germany and Russia were quite ready to shoot civilians in 1914. Even at the outset, the possibility exists that the very substantial changes in policies regarding "enemy" civilians we have discussed above do seem to have affected the behavior of European armies fighting other Europeans.

But things did get worse. The process of warfare—both Western Front warfare and the many other kinds of World War I combat—led in many directions, but one of these was in the direction of seeing violence as an end in its own right. This led to putting into practice the ideas of prewar thinkers who extolled violence as a kind of purifier of society, such as the French "social thinker" George Sorel. Once the war started, many soldiers were repelled by the violence of modern war, but some were attracted by it. Responding directly to his experience in the trenches, German Western Front fighter Ernst Jünger expressed something like a Sorelian praise of violence in *War as Inner Experience*. The positive acceptance of violence as a new and creative force is likewise demonstrated by the veterans who returned to Italy, Germany, and Russia to continue lives of violence as *Freikorps* members and SA men, as *squadristi* toughs, soldiers in Red or White armies, or as soldiers of fortune in whichever factions of whichever civil war they happened to fall. Living with violence on the war fronts likewise had a more general cultural impact. In an important recent assessment, Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius has shown that the Eastern Front was a transformative experience for many German soldiers and officers. The vast and to Germans "strange" region lent itself, Liulevicius argues, to the reconceptualizing of violence as acceptable. Indeed, he sees the Eastern Front of World War I as an important episode in the history of the brutal Hitler orders for special ruthlessness before the invasion of Poland in 1939 and Russia in 1941.[35] It is also pertinent to point out here that Europe's most famous ethnic cleanser, Adolf Hitler, held his first job as soldier for four and a half years on the Western Front.

A growing literature is beginning to trace the "mobilization" of home fronts in much greater detail, and indeed the "totalization" of the civilian populace. These studies look at ways in which the values of the war really were brought home to the belligerent popula-

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[35] On postwar violence, see Robert G. L. Waite, *Vanguard of Nazism: The Free Corps Movement in Postwar Germany 1918-1923* (New York, 1969). For the eastern front, see Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, *War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity and German Occupation in World War I* (Cambridge, Mass., 2000).

tions, parallel perhaps to the processes designed to whip up hatred of the enemy in George Orwell's fictional social critique, *1984*.[36] Indeed, an important aspect of this research is the emphasis on "mobilization" as a process initiated by the state, and with the tools of the state, such as the army, and including war itself. It is important to note that in spite of such rising levels of hatred and brutality fostered among populations at war, one can also trace a persistent revulsion against war among participants on the battle fronts and a opponents to the encompassing patterns of war at home. We may indeed generalize from the evidence that the war produced more violent proclivities (after the pattern of modern inner city violence), but we must also be careful to identify the sources of the mobilization process itself.

Another wellspring of modern ethnic cleansing is Marxism–Leninism. Recent scholarly studies, including those in this volume dealing with the Soviet Union's history of ethnic cleansing, demonstrate that the conquest of the Russian Empire by Marxist-Leninists contributed quite directly to the emergence of ethnic cleansing and other population manipulations.

The massiveness of Stalin's ethnic cleansing is evident. Robert Conquest rightly subtitled his biography of Stalin, "Breaker of Nations."[37] Lenin had originally promoted Stalin within the party partly because the Georgian packaged himself as an expert on nationalities, and indeed Stalin was listed in Lenin's first Bolshevik government as Commissar for Nationalities. Stalin's first work as Nationalities Commissar was to word a Decree on Nationality (15 November 1917) which outlined the "Free development of national minorities and ethnic groups inhabiting Russian territory." Stalin's knowledge of nationalities later combined with his paranoia to create ethnic cleansing on a massive scale on many peripheries of the former Russian Empire. In scope of repression and killing, Stalin was the twentieth century's "greatest" ethnic cleanser.[38]

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[36] See the essays in John Horne, ed., *State, Society and Mobilization in Europe during the First World War* (Cambridge, 1997).

[37] Robert Conquest, *Stalin: Breaker of Nations* (New York, 1991), 70-71.

[38] Both Conquest and A. M. Nekrich studied this question as early as the 1970s. See Nekrich, *The Punished Peoples: The Deportation and Fate of Soviet Minorities at the End of the Second World War* (New York, 1978). A number of Soviet scholars have produced studies of Stalinist ethnic cleansing since 1991. For a summary of this work and some statistical materials, see J. Otto Pohl, *Ethnic Cleansing in the USSR, 1937-1949* (Westport, Conn., 1999). See, more recently, Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939* (New York, 2001); and Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin, eds., *A State of Nations: Empire and Nation Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin* (New York, 2001).

Yet the contribution of Marxism-Leninist Communism to the emergence of ethnic cleansing in Europe goes beyond the crimes of Josef Stalin. It is important to remember that in terms of the brutalization process associated with the First World War, Bolshevik brutality and terror was a carefully planned expedient. In even more direct ways than the violence of the Western Front, intentional Bolshevik terror and violence against targeted individuals and groups, even in the first months of the Bolshevik regime, helped create an atmosphere of extraordinary brutality that marked the history of the Soviet Union and radiated outward to influence even more of the twentieth-century world. The groundbreaking collection entitled *The Black Book of Communism*, first published in France in 1997, demonstrates that violence was not simply the result of Stalin's paranoia or even yet some *ad hoc* and desperate strategy of Lenin. Extraordinary and exemplary violence was the considered policy of the Bolshevik leadership from the beginning.[39] Recent work by political scientist A. James Gregor on the relationship between Marxism to Fascism suggests that we might cast the net even more broadly. In his view, even the Italian Fascist praise of and proclivities toward political violence is traceable in some degree to its parentage on the Marxist left.[40] Recent studies have also pointed to the links between the concept of "collective guilt" and Marxist-Leninist regimes, from Lenin to Ceau∑escu.[41]

In sum, at the level of "mobilizing" societies and individuals, we can think of the war as kind of inoculation against the horrors of violence. At the same time, the rise of Bolshevik terror and a whole new complexion of brutality against targeted domestic groups, including routine spectacular cruelty in war to troops and civilians alike, helped prepare the way for the ethnic cleansing that would become part and parcel of twentieth-century politics.

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[39] Stéphane Courtois et al., *The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression*, trans. Jonathan Murphy and Mark Kramer (Cambridge, Mass., 1999); see especially the long section by Nicolas Werth, "A State against Its People: Violence, Repression, and Terror in the Soviet Union," 33-268.

[40] A. James Gregor, *The Faces of Janus: Marxism and Fascism in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven, 2000).

[41] See below, Nicolae Harsányi, "The Deportation of the Germans from Romania to the Soviet Union: 1945-1949"; László Hámos, "Systematic Policies of Forced Assimilation Against Rumania's Hungarian Minority, 1965-1989" ; and Tamás Stark, "Ethnic Cleansing and Collective Punishment: Soviet Policy Towards Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees in the Carpathian Basin."

Thesis Five

In spite of some counterindications, it was, by and large, state policy which touched off violence leading to "ethnic cleansing" or forced migration in the period of World War I. The multiform emergence of ethnic cleansing, mass deportations, and even genocide during the First World War was associated almost exclusively with the *state* rather than with popular attitudes or with spontaneous crowd violence.

The period before the war certainly witnessed episodes of popular violence toward ethnic minorities and other groups deemed to be "enemy" populations. As mentioned above, in the Romanian peasant uprising of 1907, violence against Jews seems to have been mostly local and individual in nature, in part the settling of old scores. Russian pressure against Jews in the Pale of Settlement was marked by the frequent collaboration of local populations who joined in or imitated direct violence by the government. In the immediate wake of the war, to take another example, risings of large numbers of Poles in Germany's eastern borderlands were perhaps prepared and financed by the reviving Polish state, but the uprisings in Posen/Poznań (December 1918) and Upper Silesia (August 1920, May-July 1921) featured much enthusiasm and impetus "from below."[42]

But most cases that emerged *during* the war were associated with the state, encouraged by the state, and in most cases carried out by the forces of the state.[43] We will do well, therefore, to link the history of ethnic cleansing in the twentieth century to the theoretical work on nationalism by John Breuilly and John Hutchinson, both of whom have emphasized the role of the state in the creation of political nationalism and politicized national groupings since the seventeenth century.[44] Certainly it has been the states, and indeed the most "total" states of Europe, which have engaged in violent population politics on the largest scale.

A full survey of the manipulations of unwanted populations *during* World War I in Europe would exceed the limits of this essay, but a rapid overview is necessary.

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[42] On the Polish uprisings, see Tooley, *National Identity and Weimar Germany*, 63-78, 183-188, 241-255.

[43] Naimark comments on this issue in *The Fires of Hatred*, 8-11.

[44] John Hutchinson, *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism* (London, 1987), 12-36; John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Manchester, 1982), 335-350.

Let us begin with the zone in which population politics had already been linked on a regular basis with violence and disregard for lives and property, namely, the zone of Anatolia and the Balkans northward through the western regions of the Russian Empire. There is no doubt that in this region the state carried out population removal as a direct result of the war. Both the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and the Jews in the Russian Empire had already felt the force of the state directed against them in various pogroms, confiscations, and massacres over the years. World War I brought physical transfer on a much larger scale and outright mass killing as well.

In the Ottoman Empire, the Armenians—who stood out as a prosperous, commerce-based, and Christian minority within agrarian, Muslim Turkey—were increasingly singled out for harsh treatment in the decades before the war, periodically harassed and killed by government forces. Once the war started, Armenians found themselves on the very edges of the battle front across which the Russian armies faced the Turkish armies from the Black Sea to the Caspian. Hence, the existing ideological and ethnic goals of the Young Turk leadership dovetailed with potential dangers of sabotage. Some small pockets of anti-Ottoman activity did in fact break out. The result was a genocidal massacre directed by the "Special Organization," a government agency which managed the removal of a vast number of Armenians from their homes and the rapid and brutal killing of well over a million of them. Enver Pasha, one of the triumvirate which ruled Turkey during the war, declared openly in May 1916: "The Ottoman Empire should be cleaned up of the Armenians and the Lebanese. We have destroyed the former by the sword, we shall destroy the latter through starvation."[45]

In Russia, with the outbreak of the war, authorities sensed and feared betrayal by dissident groups—especially non-Russian groups—all over the empire. Significant sectors of the Russian intelligentsia, apparently with broad popular support, regarded the Jews as natural allies to the Germans and reported on widespread acts of sabotage and betrayal behind the front. Much indiscriminate killing of Jews took place at the beginning of the war. By 1915, as the Russian armies fell back in disarray after a series of spec-

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[45] Vahakn N. Dadrian, "The Role of the Special Organisation in the Armenian Genocide during the First World War," in *Minorities in Wartime: National and Racial Groupings in Europe, North America and Australia during the Two World Wars,* ed. Panikos Panayi (Oxford, 1993), 51. See also Dadrian's *The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus* (Providence, R.I., 1995).

tacular defeats, Russian civilian and military authorities began expelling Jews in the rear of the battle fronts. Almost a million had been shipped off in boxcars within a few months.[46]

The second wave of violence and deportation broke over the Jews after the Bolshevik Revolution, during the Civil War. Especially intensive in Ukraine, this tendency to kill Jews by most of the factions involved in the Russian Civil War led to killings amounting to 100,000 Jews. The driving of many more Jews away from homes and shelter led to the death by exposure, starvation, and disease of 100,000 more. Although Russian Jews did not suffer the kind of systematic and genocidal program meted out to the Armenians during World War I, as Mark Levene has pointed out, the progression from over a hundred–thousand deaths in the period 1919/1920 to the 500,000 estimated to have died in Ukraine during Operation Barbarossa is an increase, indeed, in a gruesome process, but not one of magnitude.[47]

Pogroms and ethnic cleansing against the Jews only begin the story of the Russian Empire at war, however. German settlements in the various regions of the Empire present a parallel case, suffering large-scale forced removal at the same time as the deportations of the Jews. It has to stand as one of the great ironies of the history of ethnic cleansing that two groups perhaps most associated in the popular mind with ethnic cleansing in the twentieth century (the Germans as perpetrators and the Jews as victims) were some of the first victims of twentieth-century-style ethnic cleansing–at the same time, at the hands of the same regime, for the same reason.

Most of the German settlements in Russia owed their origin to the invitation of Catherine the Great, in the 1760s, and many Germans settled crown lands in the southern territories newly won from the Ottoman Empire. The Volga Germans, for example, started with about 30,000 immigrants in the 1760s and accounted for 1.7 million souls by 1914. German Mennonites, who landed, along with other German groups, in Ukraine, were happy not only to practice their religion, but to send out colonies, and hence, by 1909 they had produced settlements which extended from the Dnieper to Tomsk in Siberia and included settlements in Turkestan.

These Germans in Russia noticed hostility from Russian Slavophiles before World War I, and Russification impacted many of

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[46] See Peter Gattrell, *A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia During World War I* (Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1999); and Mark Levene, "Frontiers of Genocide: Jews in the Eastern War Zones, 1914-1920 and 1941," in *Minorities in Wartime*, 95.

[47] Levene, "Frontiers of Genocide," 87.

the groups, but unlike the Jews in the Pale of Settlement (the western section of the empire, to which most Jewish settlement was limited), they remained in control of their lives and property until World War I. The war brought popular distrust and animosity, but as with the Jews, it was the advance of the armies of the Central Powers which turned animosity to a state program of population manipulation. The state immediately passed a range of anti-German measures, including the outlawing of German books and the use of German in public ceremonies. Almost at the outset of the war, German settlements with any proximity to the front (in Poland, for example) were deported to south Russia. The so-called Volhynian Germans, in northern Ukraine, were deported in 1915 to the Volga region, and in late 1916 the Duma passed the Laws of Liquidation, meaning total deportation. While these goals were overtaken by revolutionary events, the laws served as an effective threat, and they would be carried out by Stalin in 1941.

The Bolshevik regime seemed at first far less antagonistic to the Germans than the Tsarist regime, even setting up a Volga German Workers' Commune in 1918. Meanwhile, though not targeted for ethnic reasons, the Volga Germans were among the hardest hit groups in the famine of the Civil War years, losing some 166,000 to starvation. Their numbers were likewise reduced in the forced collectivization and created famine of 1928 through 1933. Eventually, a second invasion by Germany, that of June 1941, would bring on the deportation of the Volga Germans by Stalin.[48]

The Mennonites were at first more or less willing to cooperate with any regime, since as an autonomous, pacifist, and devoutly religious community they had traditionally tried (and managed) to be on good terms with the government regardless of its complexion. After the Bolshevik Revolution, the Mennonites in the core settlements in Ukraine were prepared to work with the Bolsheviks if it came to that, but in 1918, the anarchist army of Nestor Makhno descended on the region and carried out the most horrific depredations of murder, rape, torture, and plunder. Whether or not the atheist Makhno had a specific hatred for the Mennonites, it was the Mennonite towns and villages that bore the brunt of his raids. The pacifist Mennonites in fact organized armed self-defense units, the *Selbstschutz*, to ward off Makhno's terror. In fact, it was after the *Selbstschutz* units fired on some Bolshevik troops, mistaking them for Makhnovites, that the Bolshevik Regime turned against the Mennonites. In the longrun, one might well suppose that the autonomous nature of these farming communities would have

[48]Levene, "Frontiers of Genocide," 83-117. See also footnote 38, above.

resulted in their destruction by the Soviets. Almost immediately the Mennonites started arranging for emigration, and by 1930 about 21,000 had arrived in Canada. Over a hundred–thousand Mennonites remained behind to undergo forced collectivization, purges, exile, and eventually deportation. After Operation Barbarossa, they were evacuated to Germany, and then after World War II, they were repatriated to Russia by the Western Allies.[49]

As noted, the Soviet regime cleansed more ethnic groups than any regime in history. We should also point out that the deporations and other "cleansing" activities began not with Stalin in the late twenties, but with Lenin at the very beginning. They stretch from the deportation of the Don Cossacks in 1920 to the destruction of some six million Ukrainians by intentional famine in the early thirties, and then to the deportations of Poles, Ukrainians, Baltic peoples, Moldavians, Tatars, and many others during World War II. Needless to say, these events fit very closely into the categories of state-directed ethnic cleansing on the western and northern edges of the Ottoman Empire and the western and southern edges of the Russian Empire.

If we move from the Ottoman and Russian borderlands to the German-Polish border region—a zone where intensive ethnic cleansing would later be carried out by Germans, Poles, and Soviets—we find a much more ambiguous picture. As described above, in the areas to the east of the Eastern Front, Russian authorities were engaged in the removal of potential German allies—that is to say, both Germans and Jews—by early 1915 at the latest. Once the great struggles in East Prussia were over, the front stabilized, giving the German eastern command (called in the argot of the time, *Ober Ost*) an occupational zone, including much of the Baltic area as well as Poland. Especially when they formed the immediate rear areas of a battle front, occupational zones were bound to undergo the most authoritarian kind of control, since individuals were completely at the mercy of the occupiers. The *Ober Ost* was managed by Erich von Ludendorff, the brains behind Hindenburg, until mid-1916. Using the same team that would later introduce forced labor in occupied Belgium and France and create the draconian, proto-totalitarian Hindenburg Program of 1916, Ludendorff was careful to appoint a "political section" of the staff, which engaged in longrange planning for the states of the east. This new

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[49] C. Henry Smith, *Smith's Story of the Mennonites*, 5th ed. (Newton, Kans., 1981), 356; see also Dietrich Neufeld, *A Russian Dance of Death*, ed. and trans. Al Reimer (Winnipeg, 1977). I am indebted to my Austin College colleague, Professor Todd Penner, for these citations and for bringing the story of the Russian Mennonites to my attention.

European East would be based on German-controlled dependent states in a region marked by new German settlements. The solutions for clarifying the borders of these new states resorted, almost casually, to population transfers as a part of larger and more complex plans for the future.[50]

From the same European region only a year or two later—the war having just ended–one of the earliest uses of the term "cleansing" in the context of unwanted ethnic groups appeared in Posen/Poznań, where local Polish nationalists set up a "Central Organization for Cleansing Poznań (city) of Jews and Germans" (*Centralna Organizacja dla Oczyszczenia Poznania od Żydów i Niemców*). And indeed, the first postwar migrations of any sort in the German-Polish border region resulted from the Poznań uprising of December 1918, supported by the new government of Poland, which led to an exodus of Germans and Jews. The "Posen Pattern"—meaning a violent overthrow of the local authorities sanctioned by the victorious Allies—echoes through much of the German official record about the border throughout the immediate postwar period.[51]

At the same time, though plans for introducing the forcible moving of populations were in the air, there could be exceptions within the region. The Slavic minority in East Prussia, for example, the Masurians, far from being the object of ethnic antagonism, were the object of intensive government favor. Mazuria had suffered much destruction during the Russian invasion, and the German government went to heroic lengths to mollify the Masurians and even win their hearts. The Russians had hardly been pushed out of Masuria when the Reich government spearheaded a massive campaign—in the midst of a desperate World War—to rebuild the war-torn province.[52] Other minorities fared less well, and much dissatisfaction arose among Poles and Danes from the German borderlands. Polish coal miners in Silesia were an important component of the growing incidence of strikes after 1916. Still, these

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[50] See the important recent work by Liulevicius, *War Land on the Eastern Front,* especially chapter 3, "The Movement Policy."

[51] I am indebted for the information on this Central Committee to Tomasz Kamusella, who also pointed me to this citation: Joachim Rogall, *Die Deutschen im Posener Land und in Mittelpolen* (Munich, 1993) 125-131. On the "Posen Pattern," see Tooley, *National Identity and Weimar Germany*, 30-31.

[52] On the rebuilding of East Prussia during the war, see Göttgen, ed., *Der Wiederaufbau Ostpreussens.*

groups were neither excluded from civic life nor separated from their property.[53]

If we move our survey to other parts of the European or Western world, we will indeed find evidence of increased tendencies toward violent treatment of populations. Most of them were similar in essence to the cases discussed above, but with much less violence involved. In the United States, where millions of German immigrants had settled since the eighteenth century, ethnic Germans experienced no general harassment, but much anti-German sentiment surfaced in spite of the large German share of the American ethnic make-up and in spite of the short time during which the United States was actually at war. Mob violence in a few cases led to lynch-type activities directed against Germans, and certainly the propaganda against the Germans was intense enough to make many families change their names, stop speaking German at home, and otherwise demonstrate their loyalty to the United States. Anti-German wartime measures against "enemy aliens" tended to be even less vitriolic. Much closer to the conflict, in France, where hatred of Germany had been in some measure part of the national creed since 1871, the French government did everything in its power to woo the Alsatian population, regardless of the fact that they were ethnically part of Germandom.[54]

The efforts of the Australian government against German Australians presents a case farther up the scale of violence. In Australia the government carried out a sustained attack on so-called enemy aliens, many of them fifth generation Australians with relatives fighting at Gallipoli and on the Western Front. One might argue that, unlike Russia's Germans in the rear of the Russian armies, these Germans were hardly in a position to sabotage and betray, but public anti-German sentiment was surprisingly strong, and as Gerhard Fischer has shown in his studies of the subject, economic influences were crucial. In 1916, in the wake of the arrival of large contingents of the Australian/New Zealand forces on the Western Front (shipped there after the Allies departed Gallipoli), anti-German incidents began to multiply in Australia. By 1917 the government was arresting Australian citizens of German origin and interning them in concentration camps. Ultimately, tens of thou-

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[53] Tooley, "Fighting Without Arms: The Defense of German Interests in Schleswig, East and West Prussia, and Upper Silesia, 1918-1921" (Dissertation: University of Virginia, 1986), 5-33.

[54] On Germans in the United States: Frederick C. Luebke, *German–Americans and World War I* (Dekalb, Ill., 1974); on Alsace, Paul Smith, "The Kiss of France: The Republic and Alsatians during the First World War," in *Minorities in Wartime*, 27-49.

sands were interned, and most of the property of this prosperous merchant class was confiscated by the state. Eventually, the bulk of these Germans departed from Australia.[55]

Extending the comparison of ethnic politics and population manipulation to the wake of World War I, attitudes appear to have changed in the course of the war. In the peace settlements, the Allied peacemakers gave much thought to various ways to draw Europe's new borders, but in the end, ethnicity became the default consideration. Whatever else Woodrow Wilson's attachment to "self-determination" represented, at its core it was less a Renanian call for a "daily plebiscite" than it was a call for all ethnic groups to have their own exclusive state. In Wilson's thinking, Poles should want to be together in a country with all other Poles, Latvians should all want to be in a country with other Latvians, and so forth. The treaties allowed for setting some of the disputed postwar border by consulting the populations in referenda, but when there were plebiscite results indicating that not all "Poles" preferred the new Poland over Germany, for example, the Allies accepted with bad grace, or, alternatively, allowed the issue to be settled by short-term violence, as in the case of Upper Silesia, on the German-Polish border.[56]

Though the United States dropped out of the peacemaking process, the whole conception of "purifying" ethnic states by means of international agreements, a conception which has roots in some versions of the idea of self-determination, continued to captivate the Allies. Though Ottoman Turkey had been on the side of the Central Powers in the war and Greece with the Entente, postwar history effected a startling change in relation– ships. Turkish nationalists headed by Mustafa Kemal (later renamed *Atatürk*) fought off Entente invasions, including one by Greece in the west, then did away with the Ottoman Sultan and Empire, and then reformed and partly modernized the country. For numerous reasons the Allies now agreed to renegotiate the Treaty of Sèvres. The result was the new Treaty of Lausanne and a smaller, ethnically purer, Turkish Republic of Turkey, built more along the lines of European-style ethnic unity. The negotiating powers enhanced this result by agreeing to exchange minority populations, Greeks in Turkey for Turks in Greece.

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[55] Gerhard Fischer, *Enemy Aliens: Internment and the Homefront Experience in Australia, 1914-1920* (St. Lucia, Queensland, 1989). See also Fischer, "Fighting the War at Home: The Campaign against Enemy Aliens in Australia during the First World War," in *Minorities in Wartime*, 263-286.

[56] Tooley, *National Identity and Weimar Germany*, 218-270.

This was the result on its face. In reality, the 1.3 million Greeks in Ottoman Turkey had suffered deportation, concentration camps, and a high mortality rate during the war, for reasons directly related to the Armenian horrors. At the end of the war, when Greece invaded western Anatolia, the Turkish authorities killed more local Greeks. In the end, when the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 arranged for the exchange of 1.3 million Greeks and 356,000 Turks, the actual number of Greeks not already dead, kidnaped to the interior of Anatolia, or driven out of Turkey was about 290,000. The Turkish Army and police drove them from their homes with great ferocity, sending them under the worst conditions and with no provisions to ships which would take them away. The Turks and other Muslims in Greece were kicked out immediately and with great compulsion. Treaty provisions for compensation of individuals were never implemented.[57]

Many of the cases examined here point up the financial benefits which accrued to the state in connection with ethnic cleansing policies. In the case of the Armenians, the property of the prosperous victims was directed into state coffers or went as payment to various groups and individuals.[58] Indeed, when we remember that the fiscal pressures of the war on governments was one of the war's salient elements of political economy,[59] we will understand that the wealth and property of the thousands of individuals driven from their homes and murdered during the First World War played no insignificant role in government plans.

Looking at all of these cases, we might discern a continuum of intensities in population politics in the period of World War I. The most violent and relentless case was undoubtedly the genocide in Armenia. At the other end of the spectrum would be the belligerent countries where neither state programs nor popular pressures led to violent activity against some identified ethnic group. We will find ethnic cleansing at the more violent, the more intensive end of the spectrum, but we will see gradations of activities

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[57] A brief view is given in Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*, 42-56. For more extensive treatment, see Dmitri Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and Its Impact Upon Greece* (Paris, 1962).

[58] See Lorna Touryan Miller and Donald Eugene Miller, *Survivors: An Oral History of the Armenian Genocid*e (Berkeley, 1999).

[59] An introduction to the war economy among the Western Front powers is in Hunt Tooley, *The Western Front: Battleground and Home Front in the First World War* (London, 2003), chapter 4.

throughout the war period that derive from the same source and display many of the same traits.[60]

Thesis Six

Most cases of ethnic cleansing in Central Europe in the period of World War II and after stemmed from or were in some way related to the territorial aspects of the Paris Peace Settlement of 1919/1920.

The peace settlement in the wake of the First World War is still a controversial and at times daunting topic. It encompasses ideas about modern liberalism and democracy, issues of international balance and the size of states in an international system, collective guilt, and a host of other subjects. The historical craft has been generally critical of the peacemakers and the peace they produced, though historians of foreign relations have, from time to time, tried to rehabilitate both the Paris Peace and its architects.[61] Still, criticism of the settlement has tended to remain the dominant attitude. Most historians and scholars of international affairs would agree that the particular ways in which Europe was "reconstructed" led to many problems in the interwar period and beyond. This is especially true for historians of the border settlements and of the subsequent ethnic history of East Central Europe.

One might point out, on the positive side that where border-related problems are concerned, the Paris peacemakers were not completely oblivious to the minorities they were creating with their new borders. In fact, they set up a series of minority treaties which were to protect those ethnic minorities created by the new borders (even if their successors showed little enthusiasm for protecting minorities after the war). The territorial settlement has been defended in detail in various points for various reasons.[62]

Yet a review of the specific border changes and their consequences makes it difficult to deny that a majority of the ethnic conflicts which would lead toward genocide and ethnic cleansing in the period of World War II either originated with the

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[60] For an early, and incisive, analysis of the interconnected problems of nation, state, and minority, see Mises, *Nation, State and Economy*, 39-55.

[61] Examples are Paul Birdsall, *Versailles Twenty Years After* (New York, 1941); and more recently, Clifford R. Lovin, *A School for Diplomats: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919* (Lanham, Md., 1997).

[62] See the important study by Richard Blanke, *Orphans of Versailles: The Germans in Western Poland, 1918-1939* (Lexington, Ky., 1993).

territorial aspects of the peace settlement of 1919/1920 or were at least spurred on by the treaties of the Paris suburbs.[63] Ethnic borders througout East Central Europe were confused and confusing, both to outsiders and to the inhabitants of this complicated region. Before the war, four great empires had presided over the collection of dozens of nationalities stretching from the Baltic to the Balkans. With the collapse of these empires, East Central Europe partly remade itself and partly was remade in the form of national states, some based on preexisting states, some based on areas with no recent history of autonomous existence. No border lines could be conceived which could have divided people into true "ethnic states." The ethnic groups in this whole zone of Europe were mixed and mingled at the edges and often not just at the edges. Hence, the creation of the new "successor states" after World War I necessitated "cleaning up" ethnically. The Western powers tried to enforce minority treaties in all these states, but with little in the way of leverage. All these states eventually discriminated in one way or another against the outgroups and minorities inside their borders, leaving a legacy of interethnic bitterness. Some of the greatest bitterness came from peoples who had fought for the Central Powers and lost: Germans and Hungarians in particular. Both saw the borders redrawn to include them in outgroups in the new national states run by other national groups. But many minorities in East Central Europe faced becoming targets of expropriation and marginalization during the interwar period. Hence, where ethnic nationalism in the old empires had produced only occasional bitterness, in the interwar period ethnic hatred and bitterness grew apace as a result of the peace treaties which drew and confirmed the new borders.[64]

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[63] A number of recent studies and collections tend to support this assertion. See Carole Fink and Peter Baechler, eds., *L'Etablissement des Frontières en Europe après les Deux Guerres Mondiales* (Bern, 1996); Seamus Dunn and T. G. Fraser, eds., *Europe and Ethnicity: World War I and Contemporary Ethnic Conflict* (New York, 1996); Christian Raitz de Frentz, *A Lesson Forgotten: Minority Protection Under the League of Nations: The Case of the German Minority in Poland* (New York, 1999); Carole Fink, "The League of Nations and the Minorities Question," *World Affairs* 157 (Spring 1995): 197-205; Manfred F. Boemeke, Gerald Feldman, and Elisabeth Glaser, eds., *The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment After 75 Years* (Cambridge, 1998). From the standpoint of legal scholarship, see Jennifer Jackson Preece, "Ethnic Cleansing as an Instrument of Nation-State Creation: Changing State Practices and Evolving Legal Norms," *Human Rights Quarterly* 20 (1998) 817-842.

[64] One of the best short accounts of the territorial changes and their effects is still Leonhard von Muralt, *From Versailles to Potsdam*, trans. Heinrich Hauser (Hinsdale, Ill., 1948).

In a sense, following the collapse of the four empires no conceivable set of new boundaries could have satisfied all concerned. But the outlook of the principle Allied peacemakers contributed to many of the problems. The polestar of border–drawing at Paris was the phrase "self–determination." Whatever this expression meant in general parlance then or means now, Woodrow Wilson, his expert advisors of the "Inquiry," and many European peacemakers used the phrase to mean simply that the new borders of Europe should correspond to ethnic boundaries, and further that–given the opportunity—all right-thinking European individuals would choose to live in a state together with their ethnic relatives. When the big three discussed the determination of the Upper Silesian border, for example, both Clemenceau and Wilson insisted that a plebiscite was completely unnecessary, since "statistics" had revealed that the "great majority of Upper Silesia" was Polish. The minutes show Lloyd George replying that the Four should not toss aside the German claim that many Polish Upper Silesians preferred Germany: "Surely the clause just read did not mean that if the Poles preferred to remain under Germany, they would have to become Polish because they were of Polish race." Wilson replied: "We have no doubt about the ethnographic fact.... what I said in the Fourteen Points does not compel us to order a plebiscite in Upper Silesia."[65]

Many agendas were at work with Wilson and other peacemakers of 1919, but it is nonetheless the case that they tended to assume that ethnic belonging implied political allegiance, that "ethnography" determined loyalty. This assumption would be strikingly disproven in all three plebiscites on Germany's eastern borders (Allenstein and Marienwerder in West Prussia and Upper Silesia), since substantial portions of non-"German" populations voted to remain in Germany.[66]

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[65] See the very useful comparison of the different versions of minutes taken during Council of Four meetings (in particular the discusson of 3 June 2002), done by Henry Schwab of Princeton, New Jersey, in a web-published essay, "The Paris Peace Conference 1919: Woodrow Wilson, Hankey and Mantoux," dated 2001 and accessed on the web on July 28, 2002, at http://www.schwab-writings.com/hi/wi/index.html. The published versions of the Council of Four discussions from June 1919 are in Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* (Princeton, N.J., 1989); and Paul Mantoux, *The Deliberations of the Council of Four (March 24-June 28, 1919)*, trans. and ed. Arthur S. Link with the assistance of Manfred F. Boemeke (Princeton, N.J., 1992). I have used quotations from both versions, which may be consulted most conveniently in Schwab's collation.

[66] On the most disputed plebiscite area, Upper Silesia, see Tooley, *National Identity and Weimar Germany*, 218-252; and Tooley, "German Political Violence and the Border Plebiscite in Upper Silesia, 1919-1921," *Central European History* 21 (March 1988): 56-98.

And the attempt to create a Europe of ethnically determined borders drew all parties into the ensuing struggles. New states favored by the Allies, the vanquished states (or parts of them) which faced losing territories long connected them, the Allies themselves—all found themselves in struggles in which the well–being of local people had little or no weight at all. Again, the Upper Silesian case provides an example. When the Allies eventually arranged for the plebiscite in Upper Silesia, both sides sent plenipotentiaries to deal with the Interallied Plebiscite Commission. The German representative was Prince Hermann von Hatzfeldt, whose humane views were overwhelmed in what might be called the ethnification of the border. Once on the ground, Hatzfeldt suggested to Berlin that several of the easternmost regions just be given up to Poland, since the struggle was producing so much bitterness. The German Foreign Office quickly put an end to any thoughts of conceding territory. On the other hand, Hatzfeldt tried to persuade the Interallied Commission to set an early date for the plebiscite itself: "The longer the plebiscite is put off, the greater grows mutual embitterment; and in the end, even after the plebiscite—let it turn out how it will—the Germans and Poles will find themselves with the task of living beside and with each other." Unheeding, the Commission put the vote off until nearly a year later, in March 1921.[67] Governments on both sides of the question marginalized the interests of local regions and individuals. The Allies, in effect, saw their main interest in creating "ethnographic" boundaries, in Wilson's terminology. The Germans saw theirs as holding onto as much territory as possible, even if the local people did want to be a part of the new Poland.

These are aspects of a single case, but the peace settlement encompassed border changes throughout Central and East Central Europe. Germany, Austria, and Hungary (the vanquished) felt keenly the loss of national territory and breakup of longstanding associations. The countries who had sided with the victors did not lose territory, yet all these countries wanted more than they held at the end of the peacemaking. Hence, though the successor states wanted to maximize territory, they also aimed to create the hardshell ethnic states prescribed by late nineteenth-century nationalism. These two goals in fact contradicted each other. The larger the territory, the more likely it was that sizeable minorities

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[67] Tooley, *National Identity and Weimar Germany*, 148; for some important patterns of the plebiscites, see Tooley, "The Internal Dynamics of Changing Frontiers: The Plebiscites on Germany's Borders, 1919-1921," in *L'Etablissement des Frontières en Europe après les Deux Guerres Mondiales*, ed. Carole Fink and Peter Baechler (Bern, 1996).

would be included. The internal policies of these states would invariably discriminate against minorities. So Hungarians in Transylvania suffered under Romanian rule; Croatians disliked their new Serbian ruling class; Slovaks, Hungarians, and Germans felt marginalized in Czechoslovakia; Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Germans, and others in Poland faced inequities and sometimes worse at the hands of the Polish state; this list could go on and on. Many Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians hoped to regain national irredenta at some future date, and perhaps in the process settle old scores. One might also add to this general picture that the national states of the new East Central Europe were careful to keep the fires of bitterness smoldering between the wars, since the leaders of these states in essence agreed that impermeable ethnic borders and centralized national cohesion formed the goal of all of modern statecraft.

Many peacemakers foresaw troubles with this confusion of motives and aims—Harold Nicolson and his classic account of work on the South Slav Committee at Paris come to mind[68]—but the confusion of aims and the desire to cut the losers down to size exacerbated what would have been a terribly confusing set of national borders in any case. The resulting imbalances helped engendered bitterness that would reemerge literally with a vengeance twenty or twenty-five years later. In the context of the present essay, therefore, it is important to distinguish the treaties of Paris as a very specific cause of the emergence of twentieth-century Europe's particular brand of ethnic cleansing.

This is not to say that the peace treaties were the only causative factors of ethnic cleansing, or even that ethnic cleansing would never have taken place under some other international settlement. But a mere perusal of the chapters of the present collection of studies demonstrates the extent to which bitterness, hatred, and ethnic cleansing resulted when the Allies engineered ethnic minorities into hostile national states by the Allies in 1919, and when such engineering provoked predictable countermeasures.

Conclusion

In the period of World War I, activities and processes which we might call ethnic cleansing remained limited to a specific zone of Europe. Since the French Revolution, all European states have at one time or another seen their ethnic minorities as roadblocks to national cohesion and national fulfillment. Yet it is important to recognize that until after World War I, ethnic cleansing in the nar-

[68] Harold Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919* (New York, 1939).

row sense only took place within a zone of Europe whose western boundary we might describe as passing southward from Riga to Warsaw, thence southeastward, skirting the lands of the Austrian Empire, to Bucharest, then southwest across Serbia and directly south to the sea. In terms of the continuum of governmental behaviors we have reviewed, ethnic cleansing took place only eastward of this line until the period leading to World War II.

Still, if we reorganize our search by breaking down ethnic cleansing into some basic components, we find that the combination of national state and late nineteenth-century empire—with a strong dose of Social Darwinism intermingled in both—capable of engaging in many of the behavioral components of what we call ethnic cleansing. We also find that the war served as an accelerator of ethnic cleansing in several ways. On a practical level, the war destroyed old boundaries and raised up new "ethnic states" throughout East Central Europe; and the ethos of these states created situations in which ethnic cleansing presented itself as an obvious solution to problems. At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that states have been much more implicated in ethnic cleansing than undirected populaces—it has tended to be states or quasi-states that have begun, urged on, and directed ethnic cleansing. Since World War I represented an acceleration in the scope and power of government, and in its need for centralization and homogenization, it is not surprising that the intensity of governmental action against unwanted ethnic minorities accelerated as well. This rapid and—in a terrible way—innovative acceleration in the aggrandizing state's war against its domestic "enemies" really imparts the defining characteristic to the twentieth century's population politics. The quest for a homogenous nation, the pressures of the growing state, the need to transfer "enemy" wealth to the state, the Social Darwinist imperatives of "demographic" solutions to the struggle for survival: all these elements of later ethnic cleansing were ground–tested during the First World War, a conflict we might well describe as the midwife of modern population politics.