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John Perry -- "The First Night" (I)

Our first reading is a fictional dialogue written by John Perry. This dialogue differs from our other readings in this unit in that Perry does NOT present a specific theory of personal identity, but rather examines (and ultimately rejects) the idea that your soul defines who you are.

Before continuing, a few warnings are in order. Philosophers tend to challenge ideas that are important to us. In the following dialogue, John Perry challenges an idea that many people accept, i.e. the idea that your soul is responsible for your identity. Perry does NOT argue either for or against the idea of your HAVING A SOUL, but instead asks how relevant the existence of a soul is to questions of personal identity. If you accept the idea that Perry is challenging, you might find this reading unsettling. My purpose in assigning it is NOT to convince you of the truth of Perry's claims, but to encourage you to reflect on what Perry is saying, and form your own response to it. Reflection of this sort is never easy, but it is necessary if you are to understand the strengths and weaknesses of your own beliefs.

If you think that Perry's view is utterly nuts, that's fine...your grade in this course is utterly independent of the specific views you hold. Instead, your grade is based on the strength of the reasons you can offer for whatever view you endorse. Put differently, what you believe isn't as important as why you believe it (and how well you can explain and defend the belief you have).

Lecture notes for pages 6-10:

Note Gretchen's challenge on page 7: "Simply persuade me that my survival, after the death of this body, is possible, and I promise to be comforted." The KEY here is not that life (of any sort) after death be possible, but only that HER survival be possible. So for Gretchen to find comfort, she must be convinced that it is possible for HER to survive. ("...the only relation that supports anticipation and memory in this way, is simply identity.") Unless some essential element of her identity is preserved, she (Gretchen) has nothing to look forward to with "mere" life after death.

To see this, suppose I told you that after death, you will return as an extremely rich, powerful, attractive, benevolent ruler. Would you take comfort in this? You would only if you ceased being Jane the AC student and became Jane the rich-and-powerful-and-attractive-and-benevolent-ruler. If you became Gorg the rich-and-powerful-and-attractive-and-benevolent-ruler, YOU (Jane) would have ceased to exist. In that case, you would not have survived and hence would not be comforted knowing that Gorg would exist.

Can you see how this last point explains Gretchen's objection to the "merger with being" (MWB) argument? (p. 8). She distinguishes two possible senses of what it might mean to "merge with being" -- an obviously true physical sense and a grander cosmic sense. Take the first sense; if MWB means "become one with nature in an ecological sense" (i.e. our bodies decompose and become part of the earth), then OF COURSE we all "merge with being" when we die. But since our identities don't survive, who can take comfort in this? Are you comforted knowing that your body will decompose into the soil? (If you are, it's not because you think that YOU (in any meaningful sense) have survived such a merger).

Take the second sense -- suppose "merger with being" means that I will become part of the identity of the universe, or one with Being, or something similar to this. Gretchen claims that for her to take comfort from this thought, she must be convinced that after such a merger she (Gretchen) will have survived, and that is precisely what does NOT happen in such a merger. Here, in premise-conclusion form, is the argument Gretchen is making:

1. If I am to be comforted right now (here in my hospital bed) by the possibility of "merging with being", then after such a merger I, Gretchen, must survive.

2. For me to survive, there must be someone who will (in some sense) exist, and who will be related to me in such a way that it will be right for her to remember what I have thought and done.

3. But if "merging with being" means that my identity will somehow be combined with others into some new identity, then I, Gretchen, will not have survived (as defined in premise 2). (No one survives such merger as themselves, but becomes part of a new whole).

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3. Therefore, I will not be comforted if I "merge with being."

Notice that Gretchen is not denying that such a merger is possible...she only claims that if it were to happen, it would give her no comfort right now, because SHE would still cease to exist as Gretchen when such a merger occurs.

Miller's First Argument (middle of 9)

1. It is possible that after you die, you and I (Sam and Gretchen) will meet somewhere a thousand years from now.

2. If it is possible that you and I meet somewhere a thousand years from now, then it is possible that you will have survived.

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3. Therefore, it is possible that after you die, you will have survived.

GRETCHEN'S CRITIQUE: Problem lies with premise 2 -- in what sense is the person Sam is to meet one thousand years from now identical to the person lying in the hospital bed?

Sam sees no problem here...he says he can easily imagine that a person IDENTICAL to Gretchen might exist in the Hereafter. So what IS the problem?

FOR CLASS, I want you to be able to explain Gretchen's objection to Sam's argument above...(HINT: what different meanings can the phrase "X is identical to Y" have?)

John Perry -- "The First Night" (II)

Lecture notes for pages 10-16:

REVIEW: Remember what Gretchen's challenge is: "Simply persuade me that my survival, after the death of my body, is possible, and I promise to be comforted."

We already saw how the "Merger with Being" argument failed to meet Gretchen's challenge (by failing to preserve her identity). Also, simply asserting that someone identical to Gretchen will exist 1000 years from now won't work, because an exact copy of Gretchen won't meet the challenge she has set out.

Miller's Second Argument (p. 11)

1. Your identity is determined by (or is caused by) your soul.

2. Your soul (which is immaterial) is intimately related to but not identical with your body.

3. But if your soul (which is immaterial) is intimately related to but not identical with your body, then the death and rotting away of your body does not result in the death of your soul.

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4. Therefore, it is possible that you (i.e. your soul) will survive after the death of your body.

What is Gretchen's objection to this argument?

She begins by questioning the evidence Sam has for the truth of premise two, i.e. the claim that the soul is intimately related to (but is still distinct from) the body.

Here is how Gretchen proceeds. First, she notes that if the first premise of the preceding argument is true (that your soul causes or creates your identity), then when Sam identifies Gretchen (i.e. when Sam says "You are Gretchen Weinrob") he is ACTUALLY making a judgment about her soul (i.e. he is REALLY saying "You possess the soul that is causally responsible for Gretchen Weinrob's identity"). Think about this...what Gretchen is doing is drawing a logical implication from Sam's premise.

LOGICAL IMPLICATION -- If one belief logically implies another, that means accepting the first belief commits you to accepting the second.  For instance, if I believe that my car is out of gas, that implies that I believe I have a car.  So here, if the soul causes one's identity, then that logically implies that judgments about identity ("Hey...you must be Arnold Schwarznegger!) are really just judgments about souls (because according to premise one, souls and souls alone are responsible for identity).

So far, so good. Sam really can't object, because if he accepts premise one, he must accept whatever that premise logically implies.

Now, Gretchen asks Sam, how do you make a judgment about a soul? Put differently, how do you know that the person here in the bed has the same soul (i.e. is the same person) you had lunch with last week at Dorsey's? "Well," Sam replies, "it's just obvious. I can see who I am talking to." (p. 12)

Sam is reasoning as follows: if you are Gretchen Weinrob, that means (given premise one) that you possess a particular soul (the one that is responsible for Gretchen Weinrob). How do I know that this is really Gretchen's soul in front of me? The presence of Gretchen's body tells me this. (What Sam is doing here is simply asserting the truth of his SECOND premise, that the soul and the body are intimately related but not identical. If that premise is true, then when Sam sees Gretchen's body, he knows her soul is there as well).

Again, Gretchen's goal is examine the logical implication of Sam's argument. She has gotten Sam to admit that the only evidence Sam has for Gretchen's soul being present in the hospital bed is the presence of Gretchen's body. (Since the soul (by definition) can neither be seen, touched, felt, nor tasted, the only evidence Sam can have for inferring that her soul is here is that it is her body that is here). That's what Gretchen means when she says to Sam "You reason on the principle, 'Same body, same self.'"(p. 13)

So Sam's only evidence for premise two (that body and soul are intimately related but not identical) is that whenever he has encountered Gretchen's body, her soul has been there as well. This has led Sam to accept the principle "Same body, same self."

(This is just common sense, isn't it? Every time you see my body, you just immediately infer that it's me, don't you? You don't furrow your brow and wonder "But is it REALLY Dr. Hebert, great thinker, master teacher, super-dad?")

This is the key to Gretchen's challenge to Sam's argument...she now argues that if her body is the only evidence Sam has for Gretchen's soul being present, then it would seem to follow that if Gretchen's body WASN'T here, then her soul wouldn't be here either. (In other words, if presence of body = presence of soul, then mustn't it also be true that absence of body = absence of soul?) So, if her body decomposes (as it surely will after her death), then the only evidence of her soul's presence will be gone. Isn't it therefore most reasonable to believe that her soul will no longer exist as well?

Sam's in a bit of a pickle...but he's not through yet.

Miller's response (13-4)

"I do not extend a principle, found reliable on earth, to such a different situation as is represented in the Hereafter. Sam does not regard the principle "same body, same self" as an a priori truth, known without observation, but as merely a well-confirmed regularity.

What Sam means by this is that it is not necessarily the case that the principle "same body, same self" must be true always and everywhere.

What is an A PRIORI truth?  A truth that we don't need to go out and get evidence to confirm.  For instance, a bachelor is defined as "an unmarried male."  This is true by definition -- if you know what the words mean, you understand what it is to be a bachelor.  You don't need to go out and survey a bunch of bachelors to see if they really are unmarried.  If they truly are bachelors, then they must be unmarried. So "a priori" literally means "prior to" experience -- you can know that an a priori truth is true without having any experience to confirm it.

A well-confirmed regularity, however, is different... here, you DO need some evidence to confirm the regularity. (Unsurprisingly, these are called "a posteriori" truths -- truths known only AFTER one examines some evidence establishing that truth).

For instance, consider the claim "The sun rises every morning."  Is this an a priori or an a posterioti truth?  Well, how do you know it is true?   Because you have witnessed (and millions of others have as well) the sun rising on many occasions.   (NOTE: no amount of analysis of the words or concepts in the sentence alone -- "sun," "rises," "morning," etc. -- will prove the sentence true.  You must have some evidence.)  Hence the sun rising every morning is a well-confirmed regularity.

For Sam, then, the "same-body, same self" principle, being only a well-confirmed regularity, need not apply in the Hereafter.

FOR CLASS, BE ABLE TO EXPLAIN HOW GRETCHEN USES THE CHOCOLATES ANALOGY TO CHALLENGE SAM'S ANALYSIS

John Perry -- "The First Night" (III)

Lecture notes for pages 16-23

REVIEW: Sam has been trying to argue for the possibility of Gretchen surviving her physical death in some way. His latest attempt has focused on her soul, and Sam's claim that there is at least the possibility that she has one.

Sam argues that Gretchen's body provides him with a reason for inferring or believing that she has a soul. Using the analogy of the chocolates, Gretchen has argued that just as one cannot tell what is inside a chocolate with a certain pattern on top unless one bites into it, one cannot tell that a soul exists within a human body unless one "bites" into it (i.e. unless one can open up the body and see the soul).

The Similarity of Psychological Characteristics Argument

Sam argues (on pages 17) that the "same body, same self" is in fact sound, and its soundness is based on some evidence: similarity of psychological characteristics. First he argues that the soul is responsible for a person's identity:

1. Your soul or mind is responsible for your psychological characteristics, e.g. your character, memory, and beliefs.

2. These psychological characteristics give you your identity.

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3. Your soul gives you your identity.

Sam then tries to convince Gretchen that

1. If your psychological characteristics remain the same, then your identity remains the same.

2. If your identity remains the same, then your soul has remained the same.

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3. If your psychological characteristics remain the same, then your soul remains the same.

(Gretchen uses the Blue River analogy to undermine premise two of argument immediately above. For class, be able to explain how Gretchen's challenge works.)

At the close of this portion of the dialogue, Gretchen claims that arguments based upon the existence of an immaterial soul are "totally irrelevant" to the question of personal identity. Here's why she thinks that...

To say that I have a specific identity is to say that (in general) I remain the same over time. (Put differently, if I have the identity of Mark Hébert, then it makes sense to call me Mark Hébert tomorrow, and the next day, and the next day, etc.) So critical to the concept of identity is SAMENESS...to justify our ascribing to some person the same identity over time, we need to come up with something about that person that remains the same over time. If we can't establish this, then our ascription of identity is baseless.

This is why the SOUL cannot be used to establish identity...since a soul (by definition) is immaterial, we have no way of establishing if it remains the same over time. Any attempt to concentrate on the effects of the soul (i.e. like the psychological characteristics it produces) will fail, because it is always possible that these effects might be produced by different souls.

Since it's critical to identity that we establish sameness, and it's impossible to establish sameness of soul, the existence of souls (Gretchen argues) is totally irrelevant to questions of identity.